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RECENT EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN OPINION ON THE ALSACE-LORRAINE QUESTION
CHAPTER I
Introductory
In the front rank of the great international questions with which the
conscience of Europe and the world ie faced at the present time is the question
of Alsace-Lorraine. If one considers the number of inhabitants concerned, it
may appear of trivial importance beside other questions, as for example, that
of Poland, which concerns twenty million human beings at the least; or the
Ukraine, which concerns thirty millions. But no one will dispute the statement
that the question of Alsace-Lorraine is one of the greatest which diplomacy has
to solve to-day, by reason of the depth and intensity of the passions which it
arouses and the interest which two of the greatest peoples of Europe have in its
solution*
The provinces of Alsace-Lorraine have been for centuries the battle-
ground of their powerful neighbors to the East and West. Ever since the Empire
of Charlemagne broke up into an Eastern and Western half, there has been a
debatable land between them. Their history has been that of a vigorous, intelli-
gent, optimistic freedom-loving folk living on the border between great military
powers and subjected at intervals to deeds of violence and to the interruption of
all progress, industrial, social, and intellectual. Through no fault of their
own these provinces as the transition belt between France and Germany have become
the crux of some of the most difficult problems of Europe. As a borderland
they have for two thousand years experienced the usual fortunes that fall to
lands lying within an exposed and ambiguous zone. This varied and agitated
experience has produced a local character, a local outlook upon the world; local
aptitudes, inclinations, and aspirations which differentiate them from other
peoples*

2.
The geographical expression Alsace includes a tract bounded by the
Vosges mountains on the West and the Rhine river on the East. Its area is
3350 square miles. Who the first inhabitants of these regions were is unknown.
Ethnology gives us an elusive guidance, but until the coming of the Romans
nothing definite is known.^ When Julius Caesar was making his way farther and
farther into Gaul he found strained relations between the inhabitants of the
Vosges region and would-be immigrants from across the Rhine. Caesar was moved
to sympathy for these Celtic folk thus threatened by a veritable inundation from
the other side of the Rhine valley; moreover he foresaw that if the Germans be-
came accustomed to crossing the Rhine and migrating to Gaul in large numbers,
there would be danger for the possessions of the Roman people. Accordingly
,
Caesar proceeded immediately to take measures for self-protection. The arena
in which the Roman-German conflict was decided lay well within Alsace, and
fortifications and highways remain as proof of the occupation by the Romans of
the Vosges region. The end of the Gallo-Roman period came imperceptibly.
Roman domination simply ceased to exist. German settlement, preeminently
Frankish and Teutonic, was not the result of a decisive conquest, but was merely
trans-Rhenish migration. The Celtic inhabitants were neither entirely dis-
possessed nor enslaved by the German colonists.^ Whether in the course of the
centuries before 000 A. D. the predominant element remained essentially Gallo—
Frankish, or whether an inherent Teutonic quality continued to differentiate the
Alsatians from their French neighbors on the other side of the Vosges remains
a moot question. The conclusion reached seems to vary according as the writer
publishes his volume on the subject in Paris or Berlin.
The Treaty of Verdun in 843 A. D. between the three grandsons of
Putnam, Ruth, "Alsace and Lorraine from Caesar to Kaiser", Page. 5»
2 Ibid., Page 18.
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Charles the Great gave to Charles the Bald the nucleus of present-day France,
to Louis the German, trans-Rhine territory to the river kibe, while to Lotnair,
eldest son and emperor, fell a middle realm between the two familiar divisions
of modern Europe.-^ Modern Lorraine, Alsace, Burgundy, Provence, and Italy were
all comprised witnin Lothair's heritage, in addition to the imperial title
But that allotment was of brief duration. On the death of Lothair II, Charles
the Bald and Louis the German took it upon themselves to make a fresh division
of the Carolingian empire into only two parts as far as Europe north of the Alps
was concerned. The actual division between Louis and Charles of Lothair's
"Middle Kingdom" did not take place until many years after the Treaty of Verdun.
It was not until 870 A. D. that Louis the German entered into the possession of
his share, which included Alsace. The Vosges mountains instead of the Rhine
river became the boundary between the German and the Frankieh kingdoms. Germany
counted her own birthday as the day when the Treaty of Verdun was signed. A
thousand years of existence was celebrated in 1843 • Into that thousand years
of nationality, Alsace did not enter at the beginning or the endj on both days
>her fate was linked with that of another sovereignty.
After 870 A. D. the lot of Alsace as a borderland on German territory
was practically decided, although confusing cnanges continued to make ultimate
political affiliations look very uncertain from time to time. In the twelfth
century her fealty was due to the great German King and Roman Emperor (1152),
Frederick Barbarosa, while her immediate control was in the hands of lesser
authorities. By the third quarter of the fifteenth century we find in existence
two gauen
,
the Sundgau and the Nordgau, the latter Lower Alsace, dependent on
the See of Stressburg, the former, Upper Alsace, in the hands of the caaet
branch of the House of Habsburg. But even these £auen were not intact political
Putnam, Page 22.

4units. The free cities dotted here and there over Alsace were ten in number —
a goodly array of independent petty exceptions to general authority, united,
indeed, under their hereditary Prefect of the House of Habsburg. Financial
embarrassments led to a curious commercial transaction in regard to the lands
to which the Habsburgs had title. Sigismund of Austria mortgaged his right
to this territory to Charles the Bald of Burgundy, who was desirous of uniting
the Netherlands with his two Burgundies, while the territories offered to him
by Sigismund lay so as to fill in the gap between them. At St. Onier on May 9i
1469, another of the long series of treaties was signed v/hich without the
slightest concern for the will of the inhabitants disposed of tne political con-
trol of the Alsatian soil. Sigismund was given the right to redeem his property
on payment of the entire sum of the mortgage to Charles at Besancon. By this
compact, Charles, a French peer, came as a landgrave into the circle of the
. 4
Empire. No real gam came to Charles from the Treaty of St. Omer. The
Austrian dukes had not been popular in Alsace but their poverty had prevented
them from being hard masters even where they retained the right to exert any
local authority at all. But the Burgundian was determined to be ruler de facto .
Kis governor, whom he instructed to bring order out of chaos, in his efforts to
fulfill these instructions made himself the worst nated landvogt in the memory
of the Alsatians. Before the death of Charles, in 1477 » Sigismund had taken
back the Alsatian estates for the Habsburgs. His friends rallied around him when
they saw what Charles was about
}
and money was found for the Archduke, who was
enabled to offer his creditors full redemption, with the required payment in one
sum. Charles refused to accept this, and as far as appears clearly, no money
ever did return to the Burgundian treasury.
Alsace was not only dragged into the complications of the Thirty Years '
4
Putnam, Page 33.

War (l6l8-48), but was forced again and again to serve as a battlefield. The
war began as a pretext for upholding territorial religion but the motives of
the combatants, possibly clear at the beginning, became mixed and confused as
the war continued. Richelieu pursued a steady policy of reducing places which
might aid to extend the frontiers of France, and it was partly as a result of
this policy that the border landgravates of tne Vosges as well as of Lorraine
were continuously the scenes of hostilities. Alsace itself, overrun and harassed
by Swedes, Austrians, and French was slipped under French control by Bernard of
Saxe-Weimar through a secret treaty signed in Paris (October 27, 1635) » providing
tnat the landgravate of Alsace, together with all tne rights therein of the House
of Austria, should be secured to France. Among other articles one provided for
the return of Alsatian territory to Imperial supremacy at the close of the war.
During the years of more or less desultory warfare that followed between the
initiation of peace negotiations in 1642 and tneir final consummation in the
Peace of Westphalia, Alsace was held in the interest of the French. When the
diplomatic settlement came, the House of Hab6burg was willing to accept the
alienation of the hereditary right in the Vosges tract. After tne abdication of
Charles V, the Empire lost its prestige. The Ferdinands II and III of the Thirty
Years 'War were not great personages or able to hold their own against the French
statesmen growing more definitely aggressive in their plans for France. As
Richelieu said, his desire was to give to Gaul the frontiers whicn nature had
designed for it. As far back as 1646, the points concerning the degree of
sovereignty acquired by France in the peace preliminaries were hotly discussed.
Iiazarin spoke of France as having obtained "une grande province". Very possibly
even he did not realize the complexity of the tenure of suzerainty and of property
rights in the two gauen *
In 1848 Alsace celebrated the two hundredth anniversary of her annexation
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to France. But tnat was claiming for tne whole vmat only belonged to a part.
There is no doubt that immediately after the Peace, Uazarin made no attempt to
claim more than very partial fragmentary Frencn sovereignty in Alsace. An in-
demnity of three million livres was provided for the Archduke Charles Ferdinand
as compensation for his lost landgravate. The Frencn monarch stepped into his
vacated shoes. Protests, arguments, and armed interference followed before the
Alsatian towns finally acquiesced and bowed to French sovereignty. Mulhouse was
recognized by the Peace of Westphalia as independent and free to join the Swiss
league, and Strassburg was on its own basis. But the Westphalia treaties
brought no peace to Europe, for other wars came, each followed by a peace tnat
did not mean tranquillity. Yet each successive diplomatic adjustment at the
close of each series of hostilities settled France a little more securely in the
coveted possessions of Alsace. In tne Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659) the King
of Spain, as member of the House of Haosburg, ratified tne cession of family
rights in the Sundgau, although apparently the stipulated penalty had never been
paid, on the plea that tne Habsburgs had not fulfilled their obligations. These
and other differences led to another war between France and Austria, and by the
Treaty of Nimwegen (February 5, virtually all of Alsace was brougnt under
the control of France. Only Strassburg remained outside. By an act of violence
and in time of peace Louis XIV seized Strassburg in September, 1681, and incor-
porated it in France — a deed which created an enormous sensation in Europe.
Thus by the legitimate results of the Treaties of Westphalia and by the illegiti-
mate usurpations of Louis XIV during the thirty-three years subsequent to that
treaty, Alsace became materially subject in its entirety to France. Mulhouse,
alone, was not included. This little independent city, an Alsatian enclave, was
connected with the Swiss cantons. Not until 1798 was it incorporated into France,
when for economic reasons, it voluntarily sougnt union with the greater republic.

But it was not until the French Revolution that Alsace became entirely French.
The great shock of the Revolution turned it into one channel set definitely
towards France, therefore it was no unwilling province that was separated from
the rest of the Rhineland in 1815 , for by the sanction of the Congress of Vienna
Alsace remained in France. Then came nearly seven decades of national life, the
first epoch of national life that Alsace, as a whole, may be said to have had.
Certain traits of both nations were preserved, but the sentiment and national
pride were French. Throughout the nineteenth century, both languages were spoken
by all cultivated people. There had never been any disposition on the part of
the French government to suppress the use of German, so it reiaained naturally at
the service of all who wished it. When the new German occupation came in 1871,
there was, however, evidence that Germanic speech did not indicate Germanic
sentiment.
Meanwhile the territory which we know as Lorraine had its own and a
different story. Like the rest of Western Gaul and the Rhineland, Lorraine was
comprised in the Carolingian Empire and received its name by virtue of certain
partitions of tnat Empire in 843 A. D. The Treaty of keersen in 870 A. D.
which gave Alsace to Louis the German, left the major part of Lorraine under
5West Frankish sovereignty. In 951 Lorraine was divided into two duchies; one
of these retained the name of Lorraine, the otner included what is now Holland.
There are very few historical documents pertaining to the early dukes of the
duchy, but in their ducal capacity the Lorraine sovereigns were free. The bishops
of Toul, Uetz, and Verdun were princes of the empire on benaif of ecclesiastical
sees, and they were quite independent of the ducal sovereigns in the midst of
whose possessions their cities were located. From the eleventh century to the
fifteenth there were fifteen ducal administrations, all afflicted by petty ware
between the rulers and their vassals and neighbors.
5 Putnam, Page 93*
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As Lorraine was a little strip of land between bigger neighbors, it
was necessary for her to secure powerful friends, 60 she formed an alliance,
offensive and defensive, with Charles of Burgundy. The latter was to be
"Protector" of Lorraine with freedom to march his armies over the land at will.
This agreement between the nobles of Lorraine and Charles was signed November 18,
1473. The visitors were not content with what had been pledged them and substi-
tuted in many towns their own garrisons for those of Lorraine. Tne fear began
to grow that the protecting hand might prove an oppressive one. On April 8,
1475, Rene, king of the Lorraine provinces, broke tne alliance and abjured the
protection ne had once gladly accepted. Rene then depended on Louis XI to aid
him against the aggressive Burgunaian, but he was doomed to disappointment , for
the French King had found it convenient just then to make a peace with 3urgundy,
wholly disregarding his young friend's needs. Ren/ received some assistance
from the city of Strassburg and other foes of Burgundy, but it was not suffi-
cient to prevent the entry of Charles into Nancy, where he received noraage as a
sovereign duke. As this particular duchy was a keystone to his structure, it
was important to his success not to alienate the people; accoroingly he acted in
the role of a merciful conqueror. The majority of Lorrainers were prepared to
surrender their cause and accepted the new order of things without further
protests. The Emperor showed himself in complete accord with the Duke's ambitions.
Rene seemed destitute, and there was every prospect of a new regime being inaugu-
rated upon the ruins of the House of Lorraine. Charles left Nancy to punish the
Swiss for all the wrongs inflicted upon their neignbors, as well as all who had
dared to invade his province of Burgundy. Rene threw himself upon the allies,
and when, nearly a year later, Charles attempted to return to the city that had
permitted him to exercise certain sovereign rights, he found the gates closed
to him. Meantime Rene had gained substantial ground, while ostensibly maintaining
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hie truce with Charles. Louis XI had intimated his willingness to send an army
to help adjust the affairs of Lorraine. With the death of Charles of Burgundy
Lorraine missed the fate of being the heart of a brand new kingdom and again
took her place on the map of Kurope as a duchy, more closely allied to France,
but Rene' held the sovereignty in Lorraine for thirty years longer. In 1508
Rene II died leaving five sons who were all provided with fractions of the pater —
nal seigniories. The inclination manifested by Rene' for France was continued
by his sons. Henri II took Uetz, Toul, and Verdun in 1559 and from that time
the Duchy of Lorraine lived in the shadow of France.
Several times Louis XIII marched his troops over Lorraine under one
pretext or another, and the Duke Charles IV was forced into signing many treat-
ies such as those of Vec and Liverdun (I632) which put the French king into
possession of nearly all Lorraine except Nancy and a few other places. Richelieu's
comment on the Duke's cession at Liverdun was: "This is a lesson to little princes
not to offend great ones unless they are ready to be ruined. Both the Duke
and his duchy were hopelessly entangled in the intricacies of the Thirty Years*
War. Vn'hen the reckoning day came at kunster the question of Lorraine was deferred,
but the status of Metz
,
Toul, and Verdun at least was definitely fixed. They had
not been disturbed for nearly a century, when the emperor formally renounced all
imperial claims to the cities. By the Treaty of the Pyrenees^l659) the Duke of
Lorraine was nominally reinstated in his domains, but under hard conditions. He
was to cede the Barrois to France and to dismantle all his Lorraine fortresses*
Another treaty drawn up in February 1661 restored Bar as a French fief, but the
other towns mentioned were to be ceded and Nancy dismantled. In 1662, in des-
peration, Charles signed the Treaty of Montmarte, whereby the succession to the
duchy was practically sold to Louis XIV. But the Lorrainers refused to ratify
the treaty and Charles was expelled from his estates. He later joined the coaliticn
Putnam, Page 153.
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against France. His death occurred in 1675
•
During the fifty-one years that Charles had borne his title, the French
advance had been continuous. The old independent imperial status of Lorraine
was practically at an end. Charles V was recognized as Duke of Lorraine by
Louis XIV in the Treaty of Nimwegen, 1679 » the terms of which were so humiliating
that the Duke preferred to remain an exile in Austria rather than accept his
hereditary duchy in complete subordination to the French King. After his death
in 1690 his son Leopold accepted the French compromise, somewhat more favorable
than was offered in 1679* By the Treaty of Ryswick, 1697, be agreed to dismantle
all forts and disband garrisons , thus giving the seal of diplomatic approval to all
French encroachments. 7/nen Leopold died xn 1729, he was succeeded by his son
Francis, whose association with Lorraine was brief. When he was betrothed to his
cousin Maria Theresa of the house of Habsburg, successor by Pragmatic Sanction to
her father, Emperor Charles VI, Louis XV refused to allow him to carry his duchy
with him into the Empire. Accordingly by the Treaty of Vienna (1738) a triangular
arrangement was arrived at by which the Duchy of Tuscany ./as secured for Francis
in exchange for Lorraine which was bestowed on the deposed King of Poland.
Stanislaus Leszczynski, whose daughter had married Louis XV. *It was arranged
that on the death of Stanislaus, Lorraine should pass to hie daughter, the Queen,
and be incorporated into France for good. Upon the death of Stanislaus in February,
1?66, the duchy of Lorraine and her allied seigniories became incorporated into
the realm of France.
In the Duchy, as in Alsace, there persisted quite a large number of
small estates and fiefs retaining feudal relations with the Empire. On February
14, 1793 1 these small estates were incorporated into the Republic. The territory
once known as the duchies of Lorraine and Bar and the three Sees were divided into
the departments of Leurthe, L'euse, and Moselle, the last nsr.ed embracing German
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Lorraine. In Lorraine ae in Alsace there was immense enthusiasm for the Revolution
and confidence in the new France. At the Congress of Vienna (1814-15) the politi-
cal fate of Lorraine hung in the balance during the diplomatic deliberations t but
the possession of Alsace and Lorraine were confirmed as French. Alsace, however,
lest territory in the north, including tne strong fortress of Landau which for
four centuries had been one of the ten cities. Lorraine lost the valuable iron
mines of the Saar to Prussia, a process of acquiring French iron deposits which
was carried farther in 1871*
The steady aim of French foreign policy for the last nine hundred
yeers has been to insure France good frontiers. These frontiers seem to her to
have been marked out by nature herself to be the sea, the Pyrenees, the Alps, and
to the North-East the Rhine. Y.'ar after war was waged to obtain them, and the
last of the French conquerors, Louis XIV and Napoleon, in their invasions of Ger-
many and Belgium, were only carrying on the deep-rooted traditions of their
predecessors. The debatable borderlands on the Rhine have ceen a bone of con-
tention ever since the Treaty of Verdun. The reconquest of her natural and
historical frontiers was a cardinal principle in the foreign policy of France.
As for the war of 1870-71 it is not clear that Napoleon III was pri-
marily the aggressor. It is Bismarck's claim that he entrapped the emperor of
France into this position by means of a falsified telegram. On both sides foreign
war was welcomed as a cure for difficulties at home, kach emperor wagered his
Rhine provinces in the game of war. The German won and by the rules of that game
7
Alsace-Lorraine went to Germany. The people were not consulted and according to
the theory of imperialism have no right to be considered. Impartiality compels
ue to acknowledge that the historical title of France to Alsace and Lorraine
Jordan, Davia Starr, "Alsace-Lorraine"
,
Page 31.
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is not beyond cavil. Royal France took Alsace by the right of the sword. But
no other right v/as valid in those days. The two provinces were not wrested from
an organic and conscious nation; they were detached from a loose confederacy
of warring States, in which foreign poxentates had dominions and partisans. The
events of 1871 have welded together two heterogeneous elements, the greater part
of Alsace (minus Belfort) and a fraction of old Lorraine. Elsass-Lothringen,a6
the added section was called, v/as not annexed to Fru6sia but v/as simply incor-
porated into the Empire as a Reichsland or imperial territory. Before the Revo-
lution and even in the first seventy years of the last century the provinces had
little in common. Even at the present time they are still widely different in
language, manners
,
sympathies, and economic possibilities. The Alsace-Lorraine
problem is not quite the same in German-speaking Lorraine as in French-speaking
Lorraine; in Strassburg as in the rest of Lower Alsace. But the real question
of Alsace-Lorraine is primarily the question of Alsace. It is Strassburg rather
than lietz that the French people regret, as it stands for the Rhine frontier.
By a series of diplomatic manoeuvers, v/hich force our admiration if not
our approval, and favored by the rash and bellicose attitude of the French
government, Bismarck precipitated the Franco-German War in 1870. With the sur-
render of the French Emperor, and four months later the capitulation of Faris,
the provisional government was forced to accept German terms, in order to save
Q
France from further desolation and humiliation. By Article I of the Treaty of
Frankfort, signed May 30, 1871, France ceded to the newly constituted Empire all
of Alsace, excepting Belfort and its district, and German Lorraine with Met2 and
its district. The consent of the people of the ceded provinces was not considered
requisite to the validity of the transaction. The idea of allowing them to vote
on the subject of separation was dismissed as soon as suggested. By Article II
of the treaty the people of Alsace and Lorraine v/ere given until October 1, 1872,
Seymour, Charles, "Diplomatic Background of the War", Page

TERRITORY ANNEXED BY GERMANY IN 18?
1
PARTS OF LORRAINE AND ALSACE RETAINED BY FRANCE
German Alsace
Source: Putnam, Ruth, French Alsace V7777rm
"Alsace and Lorraine from Caesar to Kaiser, German Lorrai
Page 178. French LorrainiESLiiLiAi
y!5
13-
to decide individually whether they would preserve their French citizenship or
become German subjects. If they should choose the former they must by that date
have actually withdrawn from Alsace and Lorraine ana established themselves in
France or elsewhere. In annexing Alsace and Lorraine the thought of Bismarck and
von Moltke was to bring back into the German Confederation territories wnich
had been formerly a part of it and v/hich they considered historically theirs;
and also to secure the newly formed German Empire against the possibility of
French invasion in the future. For this it was necessary to have undisputed
possession of the valley of the Rhine ana the crests of the Voeges.

CHAPTER II
THE HISTORY OF THE QUESTION FROM 1871 to 1914.
Through the open door of Strassburg and Metz, Germany had been more
than a dozen times invaded and many times overrun by the marauding hosts of
France. It was Bismarck's plan to close these doors and to hold the key of
France and Germany in his hand so that these eruptions should forever cease*
After two hundred and fifty years of spoliation of Germany by France the victory
of 1870, to the mind of every German, barely restored the balance of justice.
Professor 7/ilhelm Forster, astronomer at the University of Berlin, in a personal
letter of September, 1913» said: "Since France in 1866 demanded tne whole left
bank of the Rhine and in 1370 attacked Germany by force of arms, it became clear
that Germany must for her own security, extend her borders across the Rhine and
not leave the powerful fortress of Metz on her frontier any longer in French
hands. From the reports of Bismarck's attitude towards the land transfer, one
fact emerges: his motives for demanding the readjustment of territory were not
based on the constitution of the Roman Empire or of the old German kingdom, but
on the conviction that the new Germany must be adequately guarded from the West*
The new Empire was conscious from the first of danger from France and shaped its
policy and diplomacy to meet it; war was desired as necessary to complete the
unity of Germany and to secure the natural military boundary on the Southwest.
Therefore the securing of such a boundary was German^s chief reason for the
annexation of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine and at the time of tne Treaty
of Frankfort was satisfactory to Europe generally, except to France herself.10
In the minds of other Germans, however, there was a firm, deep-seated
^ Jordan, David Starr, "Alsace-Lorraine", Page 26.
10 Burgess, W. B., "The European War of 1914", Page 49.
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belief that wanderers had simply returned to the fold. A persistent inclination
continued to count the Deutsches Reich , created in 1371, not as the offspring of
the North German Confederation, but as the heir in fee to the Holy Roman Empire,
laid to rest in I806. Treitschke, at the time of the annexation of the two
provinces, gave a similar reason for the annexation. He said: "Prussia had been
struggling for two centuries to liberate the lost German lands from foreign
domination. That it was not the national policy to force every strip of German
soil, which was given up in the days of their weakness, back again into the new
empire, but that they could not permit a German people to serve against Germany
as th9 vassal of a foreign power. That sooner or later the hour must have struck
which would have summoned the growing German State to demand security from France
for the preservation of German nationality in Alsace."^
Although Bismarck is accused to-day of desiring the provinces because
of their economic importance to Germany, it does not appear that Germany set out
to conquer iron mines, or that her soldiers knew what they had conquered. At all
events their topographical knowledge was incomplete; and while Moltke was more
concerned with strategical considerations than with industrial values, even
Bismarck does not seem to have grasped all the industrial possibilities of the
situation; he was primarily interested in those parts of Alsace-Lorraine in which
remnants of German language were still preserved, and in the territory secured
by the two strongholds of Metz and Strassburg which lay a few miles beyond the
line of language.
In 1870, Germany hoped to bring back her long lost brothers into the
common home, but it was soon realized that the brothers had become attached to
another family. Even before the official beginning of the negotiations for the
peace between France and Germany, on February 17, 1371, the deputies in the
11 Treitschke, Heinrich von, "Germany, France, Russia and Islam", Page 104
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National Assembly from the menaced departments declared solemnly in the Assembly
"the immutable will of Alsace and Lorraine to remain French territory;** "they
asserted that France could not agree to or sign the cession of Alsace and Lorraine,
that the French people did not have the right to accept such mutilation; *** that
Europe could neither permit nor ratify the abandonment of Alsace and Lorraine; *•*
that it could not allow the seizure of a people as a common herd, nor permit a
peace which would be a legitimate and permanent provocation to war."12 Tiie con-
clusion of this protest was the following: "Wherefore we call our fellow citizens
of France and the governments and peoples of the entire world to witness in
advance that we hold to be null and void every act and treaty, vote or plebiscite,
which would consent to the abandonment in favor of the foreigner, of all or of any
part of our provinces of Al6ace and Lorraine."
When the decision was reached by the National Assembly on March 1, 1871,
to abandon the two provinces and thus save France from further desolation, the
final solemn protest was made by M. Grosjean. "Delivered in scorn of all justice
and by an odious abuse of force to foreign domination, we have one last duty to
perform. We declare once for all null and void an agreement which disposes of us
without our consent. The vindication of our rights rests forever open to all and
to each one in the form and in the degree his conscience shall dictate. In the
moment we quit this hall, the supreme thought we find in the bottom of our hearts
is a thought of unutterable attachment to the land from which in violence we are
torn. Our brothers of Alsace and Lorraine, separated at this moment from the
common family, will preserve to France, absent from their hearthstones, an affec-
tion faithful to the day when she shall return to take her place again. ..13
On February 18, 1874, Alsace-Lorraine registered another protest, this
time in the very capital of the victor. In the first election to the Reichstag
1? Hazen, G. W., "Alsace-Lorraine under German Rule," Page 12 . See Appendix
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after the war, Alsace and Lorraine, entitled to fifteen members, elected men whose
first act after they reached Berlir. was to protest formally before the Reichstag
against the change in nationality forced upon them by the conqueror. "May it
please the Reichstag to decide, that the people of Alsace and Lorraine, incorpor-
ated without their consent in the German Empire by the Treaty of Frankfort, be
called upon to pronounce themselves upon this incorporation. The people of
Alsace—Lorraine, whom we represent in the Reichstag, have entrusted us with a
special and very weighty mission, which we wish to discharge at once. They have
charged us with expressing to you their thought in regard to the change of nation-
ality which has been violently imposed upon them as a result of your war with
France. •••Your last war which ended to the advantage of your nation gave it in-
contestably the right to reparation. But Germany has exceeded her right as a
civilized nation in forcing conquered France to sacrifice a million and a half of
her children. If in times remote and comparatively barbarous, the right of con-
quest has sometimes been transformed into effective right, if, even to-day, it is
pardoned when exercised on ignorant savage peoples, nothing of this sort can be
applied to Alsace-Lorraine. It is at the end of the nineteenth century, of a
century of light and progress, that Germany conquers us, and the people whom she
has reduced to slavery — for annexation without our consent is for us a veritable
moral slavery - this people is one of the best of Europe, perhaps the people which
is most devoted to sentiment and justice . To give an appearance of legality to
the cession of Alsace-Lorraine, the least that you ought to have done would have
been to submit that cession to the ratification of the people ceded. •••You see,
gentlemen, that we find nothing in the teachings of morality and justice, absolute-
ly nothing, which can pardon an annexation to your empire; and in this our reasons
are in harmony with our sentiments. Our hearts are, in fact, irresistibly at-
tracted toward our French fatherland. Two centuries of life and of thought togeth-
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ar, create between the members of the same family, a sacred bond which no argument
and much less any act of violence can destroy.
"By choosing us, feeling as we all do, our electors have above every-
thing else desired to affirm their sympathy for their French fatherland and
14
their right to dispose of themselves."
As we see from the preceding quotation, her first opposition took the
form of protest against the regime established by the Treaty of Frankfort, against
annexation to a foreign country without her own consent and in the teeth of her
passionate denial of the right of conquest. In election after election for
twenty years, she sent a solid delegation to the Reichstag of protestors against
the odious deed. But the iniquity seemed inexpugnable as year after year went
by. The victors went their way, tightening their grip more and more firmly. The
most persistent opposition appeared in the districts most thoroughly Germanic by
blood. It centers especially in Ober-Elsass and in its two chief cities of Colmar
and Mulhouse.^
To understand the Alsace-Lorraine question from the internal German
point of view, it is necessary to explain the political status of these provinces
after the conquest, in order to show that their continued unrest and unhappiness
were not due to a ceaseless and stubborn protest against the Treaty of Frankfort.
When the German Empire was constituted in 1872, it comprehended twenty-five dis-
tinct sovereign kingdoms, duchies, principalities, and free cities, and in a
subordinate position, the territory ceded by France, which was made a Reichsland
owned in common by the twenty-five confederated sovereigns. It was at first
proposed to divide the conquered territory among Prussia, Bavaria, and r>aden.
Another proposal was that it should belong to Prussia. For some time the matter
was in suspense until finally the idea was adopted that the two provinces should
^ Hazen, Page 15. See Appendix III.
15 Jordan, Page 39*
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constitute an Imperial Territory, a Reichsland, which would belong, in common, to
the twenty-five states which composed the German Empire. The king of Prussia was
msde emperor of the confederation and given extensive executive powers. Two as-
semblies were created to legislate for matters affecting the country as a whole*
The Bundesrath, an advisory body, as well as the upper legislative assembly, was
to be composed of the sovereigns of the confederated states; while the lower
imperial house, or Reichstag, was to be a popular assembly whose members were
chosen by general election throughout the Empire. In their internal affairs the
confederated states were autonomous and had their own local Parliaments. But
Alsace-Lorraine was not given real autonomy in internal affairs as was the case
with the other twenty-five confederated sovereignties composing the German Empire.
The executive power of the Reichsland was vested in e Statthalter
.
appointed by
the Emperor, and supported by a foreign bureaucracy and a foreign police force.
Before the Constitution of 1911, there was a local Parliament called the
Landesavs Echus . which amounted to nothing, as the imperial Parliament had the
privilege of initiating and enacting for the Reichsland any lav/ it saw fit. Then,
too, the delegates of the Landesausjschus, were chosen by such a complicated form of
suffrage that they represented the Statthalter rather than the people. And the
Statthalter represented the Emperor. In such an Empire, there never has been any
place for Alsace—Lorraine . The conquered territory was not a national entity.
It had no sovereign, and could not enter into the confederacy on an equal footing
with the other twenty—five states. The Germans did not dare at that time to give
l6the new member a sovereign, nor could they conjointly undertake its assimilation.
The Reichsland thus created was divided into three presidencies, Upper
Alsace, Lower Alsace, and Lorraine. Over the Reichsland as a whole a President-
Superior was appointed, who was subject to the supervision of the Alsace-Lorraine
1 ° Gibbons, H. A., "The New Map of Europe? Page 8.
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Division of the Chancery in Berlin. But the Chancellor, who was responsible only
to the Emperor, might at any moment change his attitude or policy toward a people
who were entirely unrepresented either in the local government or in the Reichstag
17
or in the Bundesrath. On January 1, 1874, the constitution of the German Empire
was introduced into the Reichsland. This brought two changes in the organization
of that country. Henceforth laws especially applicable to it, instead of being
promulgated by the Emperor with the consent of the Bundesrath alone, must also
have the consent of the Reichstag. And henceforth Alsace-Lorraine would have the
right to send fifteen representatives to the Reichstag, as if she were a state of
the Empire. She was to have, unlike the other states of the Empire, no represen-
tative in the Bundesrath, the most important political body in the Empire. By
excluding the reconquered brethern from representation in the Bundesrath Germany
failed to win the loyalty of her new subjects. V/here petty states with a tithe
of her population and wealth have helped in shaping the destinies of the nation,
the Reichsland had to feel the humiliation of "taxation without representation."
It was useless to point out to the Alsatians that they had their vote in the
1 Pi
Reichstag, for the Bundesrath is the power in Germany.
Of greater importance were the laws of 1879, enacting the so-called
Constitution of Alsace-Lorraine. The President-Superior, whose function had
been to transmit business affecting the Reichsland, now gave way to a Statthalter,
or Lieutenant Governor, appointed by the Emperor and exercising the powers
previously vested in the Chancellor. The Landesausschue was nearly doubled in
size. The executive power was vested in the Emperor, who was to appoint, dismiss,
and act through the Statthalter
,
who, in turn, was assisted by a Secretary of
State and by four heads of departments. The Landesausschuswas given the right to
17
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propose laws, to initiate legislation, but no more than before was it to be an
independent local parliament, enacting local legislation, like the diets of
Bavaria, Baden, and Wurtemberg. No bills could become law without the consent
19
cf the Bundecrath. By forcing this Constitution upon the peoples of Alsace-
Lcrraine the interests of Prussia and of the House of Hohenzollern were consid-
ered to the detriment of the interests of the German Empire. A glorious oppor-
tunity for reconciliation and assimilation was thus lost. The Emperor ?/ould not
listen to the admission of Alsace-Lorraine to the Bundesrath in the only logical
way, by the creation of a new dynasty or a republican form of government, so
that the Alsatian votes would represent a sovereign state. Professor von Treitsch-
ke said after the annexation of the provinces, "We know better how to govern
Alsace than the Alsatians know themselves.
In the first decade after the annexation, Prussian brutality and an
unseemly haste to impose military service upon the conquered people led to an
emigration of all who could afford to go or who, even at the expense of material
interest, were too high spirited to allow their cnildren to grow up as Germans.
This emigration was welcomed and made easy, just as Austria—Hungary encouraged
the emigration of Modems from Bosnia and Kerzegovinia . For it enabled Bismarck
to introduce a strong Prussian and Westphalian element into the Reichsland by
settling immigrants on the vacant properties. But most of these immigrants
instead of Prussianizing Alsace have become Alsatians themselves. Some of the
most insistent opponents of the government have been those early immigrants or
their children. This is quite natural when we consider that they have cast
their lot definitely with that of the country in which they live, and are just
as much interested in its welfare as the indigenous element.
Hazen, Page 11 7.
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The greatest effort during the last few years to assimilate thoroughly
the people of Alsace and Lorraine has been made in the schools, to influence
the minds of the growing generation against the " souvenir de France ?' and to
impress upon the Alsatians what good fortune has come to tnem to be born German
citizens. Among the boys the influence of this teaching has been such that over
twenty-two thousand fled from home during the period of 1900—1913 "to enlist in
the Foreign Legion of the French Array." The campaign of the German newspapers
was redoubled in 1911 , and parents were warned of the horrible treatment accorded
to their boys who were misguided enough to throw away their citizenship and go to
be killed in Africa under the French flag. The result of this campaign was that
the Foreign Legion received a larger number of Alsatians in 1912 then had enlisted
during any single year since 1871
•
The Pan-Germanists have been especially active in their attempts to
suppress the use of alien languages, and to unify the politics and customs of
the people on a rigidly Prussian basis. In Alsace this process is known as
"Entwelschunff(deforeipnatior.) . The first act in the policy of Germanization was
to eliminate almost completely the study of French from tne curriculum cf the
schools, at the same time ordaining universal and obligatory attendance.
Another agency intended by the authorities to promote the policy of
Germanization was the extension of compulsory military service to the people of
the provinces. As Treitschke said at the time, the universal duty of bearing
arms was sacred among the fundamental ideas of German political life. The
Assembly of Notables, dissatisfied by this request, expressed the wish that the
introduction of the law of military service might be postponed as long as possible.
In reply to this request Treitschke remarked that this v;ish proceeded from the
21 Gibbons, Page 16.
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scanty knowledge which still prevailed in Alsace of German life and customs; it
proceeded in the first place from the vague idea that there might be a war with
France, and the hearts of the Alsatians revolted against the thought of fighting
against their old fellow-countrymen , but that the Alsatians must learn to regard
their present condition as one which would last forever. The German law of
military service should be introduced as soon as the economic conditions of the
frontier territory would admit of it. In 1899 Germany practically closed Alsace-
Lorraine to French citizens and even to persons coming from France; relations
between the two countries became consequently more bitter
Changes of detail in the system of government of the Reichsland have
been made at various times since 1871 . They have not altered the fundamental
fact that the Alsatians are an entirely subject people with no rights whatever
which they can call their own; with no privilege which cannot at any moment be
withdrawn or modified by a power outside themselves. Since 1910, the German
war budget has carried successively larger items for the strengthening of forte
end the building of barracks in Metz, Colmar, Mulhouse, Strassburg and Saverne.
The former French provinces have been flooded with garrisons and have been treated
just as they were treated forty years ago. The insufferable spirit of militarism
and the arrogance of the Prussian officers in Alsatian towns, has served to turn
against the Empire many thousands whom another policy might have won. On March
10, 1910, Chancellor von Betnmen-Hollweg announced to the Reichstag that the
government was preparing a constitution for Alsace-Lorraine which would give the
autonomy so long and so vigorously demanded. Yet tie had in mind not a real
solution of the question, but some sort of a compromise which would satisfy the
confederated states and mollify the agitators of the Reichsland, and at the same
time preserve tne Prussian domination. In June, Herr Delbruck, Secretary of State
Seymour, Page 46.
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for the Interior, was 6ent to Straesburg, to confer with the local authorities
and representatives of the people concerning the projected constitution. It was
during this visit that the Alsatians were disillusioned. A dinner was given by
the Statthalter, to which representative members of the Lande sau
s
s chu s were in-
vited. At this dinner the real leaders of the country^ such as V/etterle, Preiss,
Blumenthal, \7eber, Bucher, raid Theodor - tne very men who had made the demand for
autonomy so insistent that the government could no longer refuse to entertain it —
were conspicuous by their absence. Those bidden to confer with Herr Delbruck in
no way represented, but were on the other hand hostile to autonomy. The
Delbruck project was approved by the Bundesrath on December 16, 1910, and debated
in the following spring session of the Reichstag. Despite the warnings of the
deputies from the Reichsland, and the brilliant opposition of the Socialists,
the Constitution given to Alsace-Lorraine on May 3i 1911, was a pure farce. In
no sense was it what the people had wanted, although representation in the
Bundesrath was seemingly given them.^3
The new constitution reserved the united sovereignty of the confederated
states and its delegation to the Emperor, who still had the power to appoint and
recall the Statthalter and to initiate legislation in local matters. A Landtag
took the place of the Landesausechus » The Upper Chamber of the Landtag consisted
of thirty-six members representing the University and other bodies, the Supreme
Court of Colmar, and the Municipalities and Chambers of Commerce of Strssburg,
Mulhouse, Met z, and Colmar, to the number of eighteen; and the other eighteen
chosen by the Emperor. The Lower Chamber had sixty members, elected by direct
universal suffrage with secret ballot. The first Landtag; in conformity with the
Constitution of 1911, was elected in October. It brought into life a new
political party, called the "National Union", led by Blumenthal, Wetterle' and
2 3 Gibbons, Page 10.
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Freiss, who united for the purpose of demanding what the constitution had not
given them — the autonomy of Alsace-Lorraine. This party was badly beaten in the
first election, but its defeat was not really a defeat of the principles of
autonomy^ as the German press stated. The membership of the new Landtag was
composed, in majority, of men who had been supporters of the demand for autonomy
but who had not joined the new party for reasons of local politics. Herr
Delbruck had given universal suffrage to the Reichsland in the hope that the
Socialists would prevent the Nationalists from controlling the Alsatian Landtag .
Since 1911, the eyes of many Alsatians have been directed once more
toward France as the only hope for justice and peace. In tne spring of 1912
the Prussians showed their disapproval of the actions of the new Landtag by
withdrawing the orders for locomotives for the Prussian railways from the old
Alsatian factory of Grafenstaden, near Strassburg. This was clone absolutely
without any provocation, and aroused violent denunciation, not only among the
purely German employees of the little factory and in the newspapers, but also
in the Landtag .which adopted an order of the day condemning most severely the
attitude of the Imperial government towards Alsace-Lorraine, of which this boy-
cott measure was a petty and mean illustration. The indignation was at its
height when Emperor William arrived in Strassburg on May 13i 1912. Instead of
acting in a tactful manner and promising to set right this wrong done to the
industrial life of Strassburg, the Emperor addressed the following words to
the Mayor:
"Listen, up to hereyou have known only the good side of me; it is
possible that you will learn the other side of me. Things cannot continue as
they are; if this situation lasts, we shall suppress your constitution and
annex you to Prussia.24
The answer of the Landtagto Emperor William's threat of May 13, 191?,
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was the passing of two unanimous votes; one demanding that hereafter the constitu-
tion could not be modified except by the law of the country and not by the law of
the Empire, and the other demanding for Alsace—Lorraine a national flag.
The German system of arbitrary and oppressive government was appropri-
ately crowned, a few months before the outbreak of the present v/ar^by the inci-
dent cf Saverne, or Zabern, as the Germans call it. Zabern is a small town at
the foot of the Vosges mountains in Northern Alsace. A garrison of soldiers
was stationed there. A young lieutenant, von Forstner, who was passing in review
cases of discipline, had before him a soldier who had stabbed an Alsatian, and
had been sentenced to two months* imprisonment. "Two months on account of an
Alsatian blackguard 1." h6 cried. "I would have given you ten marks for your
25
trouble." The story spread, and the town, tired of the attitude of its
garrison, began in turn to show its contempt for the Kaiser's soldiers. Windows
in von Fornster's house were broken. Every time officers appeared on the streets
they were hooted. Saverne was put under martial law. Threate were made to fire
upon the citizens. One day Lieutenant von Forstner struck a lame shoemaker across
the forehead with his sword. Public feeling even in Germany seemed outraged. The
Reichstag pessed a vote of censure. The Chancellor, perhaps unwillingly, dis-
closed the real policy of the authorities in Alsace-Lorraine by puDlicly declar-
ing that "no progress could be made in Alsace—Lorraine unless they abandoned the
fruitless attempts to turn the South Germans of the Reicheland into North German
Prussians." The obnoxious garrison was transferred to another station.
Forstner was sentenced by court-martial to detention for a short period. His
promotion, however, soon followed and stands as evidence cf the disregard of the
military for civil rights and opinion, an attitude that is again illustrated by
the protest of Dr. Jagow, the military president of Berlin, against even the
25 Gibbons, Page 17*

27.
light sentence imposed on Forstner.^ All these events had a tremendous reper-
cussion in France. It is impossible to exaggerate the ill-feeling aroused on
both sides of the Rhine, in Germany, in Alsace-Lorraine, and in France, by the
persecutions in the Reichsland. It has given the French soldiers something to
fight for which is as sacred to them as the defence of French soil. The power
of this sentiment is indicated by the invasion of Alsace, the battle of Altkirk,
and the occupation of Mulhouse at the beginning of the war in August of 1914«
Since 1371 the economic development of Alsace has not been very different
from that of other Central European districts which have a mixed agricultural
and industrial population. The economic development of northern Lorraine has on
the other hand been prodigious and exceptional. Thirty years ago this region
was a country living upon agriculture and small industries. By 1914 it was a
center of iron-mining. Before the cession of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany, iron
had been mined in this district, but it was not until after this event that the
discoveries were made which raised the district to the economic importance it
enjoyed just before the war.
The humiliation of defeat in the war of .1870, was not soon forgotten in
France, and all chance of closing up the wound was prevented by the loss of Alsace-
Lorraine, which kept it an open sore. As a German historian has said, the new
structure of the German Empire was burdened at the very outset by a French mortgage,
as it were, since in the future every foreign foe of Germany could reckon uncondi-
tionally upon French support. It was the price paid for Alsace—Lorraine . Of this
the Germans were not unaware, and the most harmless words and actions of the French
filled them with the certain belief that the war of revenge would burst forth on
the day when the German armies left French soil; nor was their conviction lessened
by the speed with whicn the war indemnity was paid. Bismarck realized acutely the
2 ^ War Cyclopedia, Page 310.
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danger that threatened, and always stood in deadly fear of the coalition of some
state with France, designed to break down the new position of Germany. 2 ? Bis-
marck, who in the early days of annexation had professed a lively and sympathetic
interest in the Alsatians, irritated by the progress of events, blurted out his
real feeling in a speech on November 30, 1374, saying that Alsace had not been
annexed because of her beaux yeux . but simply and solely because she would fur-
nish an excellent military defense of the Empire, and that Germany was equally
28indifferent to Alsatian lamentations and Alsatian wrath. Marshal von Iloltke
said soon after the annexation of 1870, that Germany would have to remain armed
for fiftyyears to preserve her conquest, but that then the Alsatians would have
become patriotic Germans and would no longer desire to get free from their new
29 r»
fatherland. The opinion of Doctor Hans Delbruck, professor of history in
Berlin, toward the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, may be summarized by the
following statement published in the London Dally Mail of August 30, 1913'. "Alsace
and Lorraine were German long before they were French, our folk song literature
is replete with songs of Stras6burg. When we took Alsace—Lorraine in 1871, we re-
gained what was our own. Why did we retake it! Because the safety of German
territory demanded it. France openly coveted the left bank of the Rhine. What
else was the real underlying cause of Napoleon's war? Alsace-Lorraine had to be
taken if part of our Fatherland west of the Rhine was to be permitted to develop,
in peace and safety as an integral part of the German nation."
Frederick the Great said in regard to acquisition of territory: "Let
30
us take, after that we shall always find enough lawyers to defend our right . w
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On May 2, 1871, Bismarck declared before the Reichstag: "There could
be no thought of our making Alsace and Lorraine into a neutral country like
Belgium and Switzerland for that would have prevented our ever attacking France;
we are accustomed to respecting treaties and neutralities."^
The official doctrine was held that it was not the Germans who terrorized
German Alsace, but that it was the French. It was through the fear of the censure
of their friends and relatives who had remained French, it was through fear of
French public opinion, that the Alsatians rejected assimilation with the Germans.
Germany's failure to assimilate the provinces is expressed by Professor Otfried
Nippold of Berne in the following words: "When one looks back into the history of
Europe during the last forty years it seems inconceivable tnat any one can be
unwilling to admit that the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was a political mistake,
and that the Germans have shown themselves incompetent in their government of the
32
people of Alsace-Lorraine."
The feeling of the peoples of Alsace and Lorraine toward their annexa-
tion to Germany cannot be better illustrated than by citing the migration of those
peoples into France and other countries immediately preceding German occupation.
Sdmond About states that out of one million Alsatians six hundred thousand refused
to accept German nationality, and took their way across the sea. The number mi-
grating from Lorraine is put at forty-five thousand. Those who felt strongly and
were in a position to go, left their land to fellow-countrymen, less intense in
feeling and less capable of action. The spirit of these men and women who chose
thus to leave their native land expressed the noblest impulses of the human heart.
They abandoned their homes, not primarily through hatred of Prussia, not because
they "would not become Germans", not even because they wished to remain French.
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Their ruling motive was their unwillingness to place tnemselves or their sons in
a position where, ae conscripts in a foreign army, they would be forced to fight
kinsmen and friends. The emigres have naturally had a large influence on their
kinsfolk in Alsace.^
The form of the contest between the Empire and her conquered province
changed, but the substance of it never changed from 1871 to 1914. Though the
expression varied according to circumstances, tne contest was always against the
policy of Gerraanization which the conquering country was determined to effect.
Rebellious to this from the very depths of her soul, Alsace was resolved that
this should never be. Her opposition to the policy of Germanization has been
the constant, unvarying feature of her history from 1870 to the present day.
In I896, Jacques Preiss, a young lawyer of Colmar and a leader of
Young Alsace, said in the Reichstag of which he was a member: "Gentlemen, the
people cf Alsace and Lorraine protested in 1871 • They protested through their
representatives, specially elected for that purpose against the annexation to
Germany. This protest has not been withdrawn since, either in law or in fact. •**
The assimilation, the Germanization of the country has not advanced a step to
this day.*** Fear dominates and poisons our political existence. The government
does not understand the people, and the people do not understand the government."^
Monsieur Freppel , a Catholic bishop, said to William I in February, 1871
"Believe a bishop who tells you in the presence of God and with his hand upon his
heart, Alsace will never belong to you."
"Our duties in Alsace", said a deputy from Mulhouse, a German by origin,
"are plainly these three: To avert war first and foremost, To use every effort
toward the liberalizing of public opinion among our compatriots in Germany, To
33 Putnam, Page 91
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coase irritating agitation for v.'hat we know we cannot get. Agitation heats the
blood and makes for enmity not friendship ."^
Many Alsatians have been heard to make this statement: "We are between
twc fires, the reproaches of sympathizers in France and the petty aggravations
of Prussian officials. We must learn to think with our heads, not with our heart
Our hearts call to France, our heads tell us that we will find our future with
Germany" . 3 6
Other utterances commonly heard are: "The force of arms will eternally
decide our fate. We are destined to be the plaything and the victim of all hates
and of all wars. Never shall we be sincerely consulted. Never shall we be asked
our desires with any intention that they should be granted. "37
The Alsatian leaders themselves have seen the peril to the peace of
Europe from the German attitude towards their country. They did not want France
drawn into a war for their liberation. They v/ere alarmed over the possibility
of this and desired it to be understood that their agitation had nothing inter-
national in it. The attitude of all anti-Prussian parties may be summed up in the
words of Kerr Wolff, leader of the government Liberal party, who declared that
all that the inhabitants of the Reichsland hs.d as their political ambition was
the elevation cf Alsace-Lorraine to the rank of an independent and federated
state, like the other component parte of the German Empire. Their sincerity and
their desire to preserve peace is shown by the motion, presented by the leaders
of four of the political groups in the Reichsland, which was voted on May 6, 1912,
without discussion by the Landtag: "The Chamber invites tne St atthalter to
instruct the representatives of Alsace-Lorraine in the Bundesrath to use all the
force they possess against the idea of war between Germany and France, and to in—
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fluerce the Bundesrath to examine the ways which might possibly lead to a
rapprochement between France and Germany, which rapprochecent will furnish the
means of putting an end to the race of armaments
.
M
-^
?8 Gibbons, Page 18.

CHAPTER III
GERMAN AND ALSATIAN POINT OF VIEW SINGE AUGUST, 1914*
As long as Germany has held Alsace and Lorraine every German has felt
that he must keep his sword bright to defend this possession. Germany's conquest
of Alsace-Lorraine has been up to the present time a constant irritation in the
body politic of Europe. France has looked forward to the recovery of the lost
provinces; while Germany has felt that she must protect herself by keeping France
weak. 3^ Taking the position that the relations of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany
were settled once and for all by the Treaty of Frankfort, 1871! she has persistent-
ly denied that such a question as that of Alsace—Lorraine exists. To all inquiries
concerning Alsace—Lorraine she has replied "the land is German by tradition, by
history, by language, by conquest and by military necessity. Alsuce-Lerraine
must be forced to resume the Teutonism her people had relinquished".^ By declar-
ing war on France in August, 1914, Germany annihilated the Treaty of Frankfort
and shattered that boasted support. At least since then there has been by action
of the beneficiary herself, a question of Alsace-Lorraine.^
In the early period of the war there were no official statements made
by Germans regarding the question of Alsace-Lorraine, as the principal object
seemed to be to strike at the heart of France as quickly as possible and thus
settle the question forever by making her a second-rate power. Count von Bernstoff
said in October, 1914, "Remember, there can be no lasting peace if even one square
inch of German territory is taken ."42 But after the failure of the attempt to
take Paris, we find almost as much interest shown in the future of the annexed
provinces by the Germans as by the French . In a speech before the Reichstag, Decem-
ber 2, 1914 , former Chancellor B ethmann-Ko llweg said; "Franc e with the full
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strength of an old war-like nation hopes to redeem the humiliation inflicted on
her in 1870."43 On April 5» 1916, he made the following statement: "At the out-
break of the war I recalled Moltke's words that v/e would have to defend what v/e
had won in 1870, in another sanguinary conflict***we confront this fact, that
when the catastrophe befell Europe, in distinction from 187C, every German
regarded Alsace—Lorraine as the indispensable price of victory; our sole object
was to defend ourselves and maintain our position, to keep the enemy out of our
homeland and to drive him as quickly as possible from where he had so monstrously
shown his rage of destruction.*** The restitution of conquered French and Belgian
territory, must be conditional upon German's receiving binding guarantees that
French territory will not in the future be a gateway through which Germany can be
44
attacked." At the opening of the Reichstag, September 28, 1916, the Chancellor
said
,
"The aims proclaimed by our enemies are becoming increasingly clear and
admit of no misunderstanding. They are lust of conquest and annihilation. It
is proposed to give Constantinople to Russia, Alsace-Lorraine to France, the
Trent ino and Trieste to Italy and Transylvania to Roumania, The French Prime
Minister said in one of his speeches that France is fighting for a firm and last-
ing peace in v/hich the freedom of nationalities will be protected by international
agreements against all attacks. We, too, desire this. We wish to protect Germany
45forever against every attack". ' In reply to a statement of Viscount Grey made
October 23, 1916, he said, "Great Britain in 1915 promised to Russia dictatorial
domination in Constantinople, snd to France, Alsace and Lorraine.*** The history
of international relations before the war stands clear before the eyes of all the
world. What made France join Russia? Alsace and Lorraine ."46 jn December of
1916 Prerident Wilson sent a note to each of the belligerent powers asking them
43 International Conciliation, Mo. 86, Page 12.
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tc state the term6 on which they would agree to end the war. The Central Powers
did not respond to this invitation. After the reply of the Entente Allies, however,
before the main committee of the Reichstag the Chancellor made the following
official announcement, "The destructive designs of our opponents cannot be expressed
more strongly. We have been challenged to fight to the end. We accept the chal-
lenge. We stake everything, and we shall be victorious
•
M^7
Nearly all exponents cf public opinion in Germany, save the Social Demo-
crats, advocate large additions to the German Empire as a result of the war, and
also the retention of the provinces which were annexed in 1871. A petition was
presented to the Chancellor on May 20, 1915 , from six of the great industrial and
agricultural associations which represent powerful and widely spread interests
in Germany . They urged that Northern France as far as the River Somme should be
annexed for their future position at sea, and the industrial establishments in the
annexed territories be transferred to German hands. A Socialist deputy to the
Reichstag is reported to have said, "In the eyes of all Socialists what occurred
in 1871 was nothing else than the return of these fundamentally German provinces
into the bosom of the great German family. During the entire course of the war
that party to which I belong has considered as a self-evident principle that the
total or partial cession of Alsace—Lorraine is not at all open to discussion. For
every German Socialist the question of Alsace-Lorraine was definitely settled in
1871. m49 But the minority faction of German Socialists, led by Karl Liebknecht,
do not seem to agree with their party on this question as is shown by the following
statement made at the Stockholm Conference in July, 191?. "We condemn the pro-
longation of the war as a means of settling the question of Alsace-Lorraine. The
population of Alsace-Lorraine, which in 1871 was annexed against its will, can
4.7
' Current History, Vol. 5, Page 500.
Ag
Y'ar Cyclopedia, Page 210.
49 Hazen, Page 19.

36.
obtain peace no sooner than by a direct ana free vote to express its wish as to
what state it shall belong."-'
A petition.adopted June 20, 1915, by the German Professors, set forth
their views regarding the annexed provinces and received the approval of the
Important men of Germany. In this petition they advocated the annexation of the
whole eastern part of France, from Bel fort to tne ccast, and desired the transfer
cf business undertakings and estates in the annexed provinces to German ownership*^"
Professor Hugo Munsterberg was also a supporter of Germany s attitude toward the
war and strongly adhered to tne official German documents. He thought that the
conflict between the Slavic and German world was inevitable as Russia was bound
to help Serbia. Russia knew herself uneo.ual in strength to the German nations,
but knew also that she could rely on France's latent longing to revenge herself
for Alsace and Lorraine^
Mr. Herman Ridder, editor of the New-Yorker Staatet Zeitung,, in an edi-
torial of that paper, impartially distributes the blame for tne war among all the
Great Powers of Europe^ omitting Geri.iany. "France", he said, "advertised her lose
of the provinces cf Alsace and Lorraine until the whole world has accepted her
sentimental attitude on this question."^3 A prominent Genuan Scientist in Sweden
told the publisher of the Stockholm Dagens Nyheter tnat even among the Pan-Germans
more than one highly placed man was inclined to burst out, "Leave Belgium and
Serbia, nay, even Alsace-Lorraine but end tne v/ar as soon as possible."54
In discussing the disannexation of Alsace-Lorraine in the Bavarian lov/er
house October 10, 1918, Count von Hertling, wno later became Chancellor of Germany,
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expressed himself unmistakably in favor of the division of this imperial territory
between Prussia and Bavaria. Of the sacrifice of this German territory, he said,
"Ihere can be no talk on this question. On this subject Bavaria must represent
not Bavarian but German views, the union of Alsace with South Germany and Lor-
raine v/ith Prussia would be expedient, but the idea of autonomy is a great mistake
and would not produce my reconcilitat ion with France. "55 For this suggestion
for the settlement of the Alsace-Lorraine question Count von Hertling was severely
attacked in the Reichstag as setting forth views contrary to those of the Imperial
Government According to the Kolnische Zeitur.p Dr. von Kxlhlmann said, "There
is but one answer to the question, Can Germany in any form make concessions v/ith
regard to Alsace Lorraine?; no, so long as one German can hold a gun the integrity
of the territory handed down to us as a glorious inheritance by our forefathers
can never be the object cf negotiations or concessions" Commenting on Lloyd
George's reply to Pope Benedict's suggestion for peace, the Foreign Secretary told
the Reichstag that the question of prolonging the struggle was not the future of
Belgium but that of Alsace-Lorraine ."Great Britain according to our information,"
said he, "has pledged herself to France that she will continue the fight for the
conquest of Alsace-Lorraine, both politically and with her armies, so long as
France desires to adhere to the program of regaining those provinces. This being
the actual situation, I think it proper to give a clear statement of our attitude,
since, curiously enough there still seems a misconception in this respect and even
among our neutral friends. Except for France's demand for illsace-Lorraine there
is absolutely no impediment to peace, no question which could not be solved by
negotiations or a settlement in such a way as to render superfluous the further
sacrifice of blood."^ Stung by President Wilson's speech of August 30, 1917,
^Current History, VcL 7, Page 452.
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in which he insisted that the future relation cf Alsace-Lorraine to Germany should
rest upon the rights of the peoples to decide for themselves as to whom they would
belong, the annexationists uttered new protestations of "never" and reiterated
their demands, encouraged by successes in Russia.^
it
Addressing the Reichstag, the German Foreign Minister, von Kuhlmann,
referred to Alsace-Lorraine as the shield and symbol of German unity and as the
only obstacle to peace. "Lloyd George says that England means to stand by the
French to the death in the demand they make for a reconsideration of the great
wrong of 1871, and President Wilson declares that* the wrong done to France by
Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace
of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may
once more be made secure in the interest of all. 1 It is the first time, as the
Paris Temps reminds us that the President of the United States has declared himself
on this question, and although they had no doubt as to his views, they are pro-
foundly glad that he has expressed them." Closing his speech von Ku*hlmann said,
"Alsace-Lorraine must be retained."^ In reply to Lloyd George's and President
Wilson's speeches made in January, Count Kertling said, "Mr. Lloyd George has
changed his tone but still implies that his duty *is to sit in judgment on guilty
Germany for all sorts of crimes'. Germany has armed only in self-defense against
Great Britain, France and Russia. Alsace was not annexed in 1871 but aisannexed.
President Wilson has also changed his tone. We will never permit ourselves to be
61
robbed of Alsace-Lorraine. **• Lloyd George speaks of the wrong done in 1871 to
France. Alsace-Lorraine comprises, as is known, purely German regions which by
a century of violence and illegality were severed from the German Empire, until
finally the French Revolution swallowed up the last remnant. Alsace and Lorraine
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then became French provinces. When in the War of 1870 we demanded back the
districts which had been criminally wrested from us, that was not a conquest of
foreign territory, but rightly ana properly speaking, what to-day is called dis-
annexation. This disannexation was then expressly recognized by the French
National Assembly, the constitutional representatives of the French people at that
time, March 29, 1871, by a large majority of votes. And in England, too, gentle-
men, language quite other than is heard to-day has been heard. I can appeal to
a classic witness. It is none other than the famous British historian and author,
Thomas Carlyle, who in a letter to the Times in December, 1870, wrote, 'No people
has had such a bad neighbor as Germany has possessed during the last four hundred
years in France. Germany would have been mad had she not thought of erecting
a frontier wall between herself and such a neighbor when opportunity offered.'
Observe that I have not repeated a very hard expression which Carlyle used about
France. I know of no law of nature, no resolution of heavenly parliaments whereby
France alone of all earthly beings was not ooliged to restore stolen territories
if the owners from whom they had been snatched had an opportunity of recovering
62them. And respected English press organs expressed themselves in a like sense. *
In reply to point eight of President Wilson's speech I can only again expressly
accentuate the fact that tnere can never be a question of the dismemberment of
imperial territory. Under no fine phrase of any kind shall we permit the enemy
again to take from us territory of the Empire which with ever increasing intimacy
has linked itself to Germanism, which has in a highly gratifying manner ever and
increasingly developed in an economic respect, and of whose people more than
eighty-seven per cent speak the German mother tongue. "^3
Vorwarts .the organ of the majority Socialists, on the third anniversary
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63 Ibid., Vol. 7, Page 392.

40.
of the war, published an article replying to Socialists in other lands who were
calling upon the German members to withdraw their support from the kaiser and his
military machine. "It is miserable hypocrisy to ask us to recognize the czarism
of the past and the clamor for Alsace—Lorraine and the Saar district at present
as the embodiment of ideal justice. Must not foreign conquest be as repulsive to
us as to our enemies? Are we expected to recognize only evil at home and not to
64
see the crimes of others?" Only the determination of France to recover Alsace-
Lorraine stands in the way of an immediate termination of the war is the opinion
of the Vorwarts . "The latest proceedings in the French Chamber of Deputies con-
firm Foreign Minister von Kuehlmann's interpretation that there is no issue pre-
vailing outside that of Alsace—Lorraine regarding which a complete understanding
is impossible. Germany under present circumstances cannot surrender Alsace—Lor-
raine. No one in Germany is even thinking of making France a present of the two
provinces and it would seem that the French do not want them in the form of a
gift." 13.? Mitta^s Zeitunp commenting on the President's message says, "There can
be no differences among us as long as our enemy keeps on talking about the sur-
render of territory. The sword is still talking. Yet a little while and the
London and Washington programs will rid themselves of those undebatable points
which to-day make controversy superfluous."^
Count Ernst zu Reventlow, leading unofficial spokesman of the ruling
classes of Germany, said that Germany's possession of Alsace—Lorraine had never
been looked upon as anything but robbery by the Americans. That President Wilson
in outlining his foundations came pretty plainly to the decisive points. "He
wishes 'that every nation have the right to choose the sovereignty under 7/hich
it shall live, and that the small states shall enjoy the same respect as the big
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cr.es. The first point is exactly the same as has been handed out by Asquith,
and Grey since the beginning of the war. It is aimed directly at our ownership of
Alsace-Lorraine ."°7
Count Czernin, Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, has directed his
efforts toward bringing about a peace based on no annexations and no indemnities.
Working in an alliance with the Center party of Germany he has aroused the fear
and hostility of the Pan-Germans who claim that he is interfering with the scheme
of Mittel-Europa . In a speech to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian
//
Delegation at Budapest, December 17, 1917, he said "Baron von Kuhlmann in his
last speech very clearly and exactly stated our war e-ims^'There is no other ob-
stacle to peace than Alsace-Lorraine. If any one should ask whether we are fight-
ing for Alsace—Lorraine , I would reply, we are fighting for Alsace—Lorraine, just
fcs Germany is fighting for us and fought for Lemberg and Trieste. I know of no
difference between Strassburg and Trieste."68 Acting as spokesman of the Central
Powers in offering terms for a general peace at the first session of the Russo-
German Conference in Brest-Litovsk , December 25, 1917 t Count Czernin stated the
terns for a General Peace. His statement was intended as a basis upon which the
Entente Allies were to join in the peace negotiations then about to be undertaken
by Russia. The fourth clause stated as a basis for negotiations proposed "that
in accordance with the declaration of statesmen of the Quadruple Alliance, the
protection of the rights of minorities constitutes an essential component part
of the constitutional rights of peoples to sel f—determination . The Allied
Governments also grant validity to this principle everywhere, in so far as it is
practically realizable." The Allies refused to take any notice of the offer so
ft
v.-hen the Conference met again on January 10, 1918, Dr. von Kuhlmann announced that
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the Christmas peace terms of the Central Powers had been withdrawn and were
henceforth null and void.^9 When Count Czernin declared that they were fighting
to keep Alsace-Lorraine procisely as they were fighting to keep the Trentino and
Trieste he said, "Not only does Alsace-Lorraine assume a large place in Allied
eyes as a clear instance of the kind of injustice to mankind that this war is
being fought to end, but Alsace—Lorraine is going to be the hardest thing for
Germany to give up» M ^0
^ Current History, Vol. 7, Page 262.
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CHAPTER IV
VIEW-POINTS OF ALLIES AND UNITED STATES
The France which seemed to be menaced with dissolution in 1871 was again
unified by the fear and hatred which the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany
inspired in her people. The call of la Patrie Mutilee became the occasion if not
the justification of that contradiction in world politics/a republic in arms'*
And although the fate of Alsace—Lorraine served Bismarck's purpose of unifying
Germany through her hatred of surrounding nations
,
it also served to turn the
nation over to the control of militarism. The Treaty of Frankfort was hardly a
treaty of peace. It seemed to be devised to keep hatred alive. Its purpose was
not so much to welcome back the Germanic peoples of Alsace as to keep Germany
71
unified against France. And thus the question of Alsace-Lorraine has divided
Europe into two hopeless alliances which we hope the present war will serve to
breek down, in that these two great nations may be able to settle this question
satisfactorily*
Seeing the result which was surely to come from the agitation of this
question, one hundred and eighty French Socialists went from the Bale Congress
of November, 1912, to Berne, in the hopes of clearing up the Alsace—Lorraine
question ,. expecting to meet there the same number of German delegates. They
found a mere handful; for as one of them said to M. Vergnet, chairman of the
meeting, "Every German, from the highest to the lowest, considers that the Alsace-
Lorraine question can be re-opened only on the battlefield. Let the French have
no illusions on that head."72 Although this attempt to settle the question by
the French Socialists was not officially recognized by either government, France
at least had hoped that something might be done. As soon as war was declared
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on France by Germany, the question was again opened. From the beginning of the
war every Frenchman felt that the recovery of the lost provinces of Alsace-Lor-
raine was the principal thing for which he was fighting.
Germany, through the neutral nations, proposed peace negotations with
the Entente on December 12, 1916. Dwelling upon the ruin with which Europe was
threatened, tne note pointed out the favorable military situation of the Central
Powers, but failed to state any definite terms of peace. Also, the note attempted
to throw upon the Entente the responsibility of continuing the war. In an ex-
planatory note to the Pope the German Government maintained tnat it had been
forced into a war of defense, an assertion that was repeated in a supplementary
statament by Austria-Hungary. In reply to these overtures, and supported by the
more important Allies, Mr. Lloyd George declared that the minimum conditions of
the Entente included complete restitution of all territory, full reparation for
damages, and effective guarantees of security against Prussian militarism. These
terms were repeated in a joint reply of the ten Entente Allies from Paris, Decem-
ber 30, 1916, whi,ch, maintaining that Germany and Austria-Hungary had provoked
the war, rejected the peace overtures as intended to impose a "German" peace and
to sow dissensions among themselves.*^
In his opening address before the Chamber of Deputies, June 2, 1917,
Premier Ribot said, "Tiie restoration of Alsace and Lorraine is not a question of
annexation and reparation for devastated provinces, nor a matter of indemnities.
Germany annexed these provinces and we simply ask for tne restitution of what
belongs to us."'^ The Order of the Day adopted on June 5 by the same session of
the Chamber of Deputies, at the close of the debate on the Stockholm peace move-
ment, contained this passage, "Unanimously endorsing the protest made before the
national Assembly in 1871 by the representatives of Alsace-Lorraine against the
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wresting of that territory from France, the Chamber declares that it awaits from
the present war, which was thrust u^on Europe by the Aggression of imperialistic
Germany, along with the liberation of the invaded provinces, the return of
Alsace-Lorraine to the mother country, and the just reparation of damages. "75
In a note to Russia, June 11, 191? , France wrote, "We intend that the faithful
and loyal provinces of Alsace and Lorraine which v/ere torn from us in the past
shall be liberated and shall return to us."76
Baron d' Estournelles de Constant in a letter to Nicholas Murray Butler
dated September 8, 1914, says, "The whole misfortune is the result of the crime
committed forty-three years ago, the crime which we accepted to avoid recommencing
the war. Our resignation has not sufficed; it has nut caused the trouble to dis-
appear. The misfortune has been the forcible annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. The
Germans are paying to-day for their fault of 1870—71, because that fault has been
corrupted and poisoned by them. In order to keep these unfortunate provinces
under their domination it has been necessary for them to use force, to institute
a regime of force. V/hatever happens, Germany cannot emerge victorious from a war
which is itself but the logical result of the abuse of her victories. She cannot
conquer civilization."77 in a letter ten days later he wrote that the true
difficulties would commence when the conquered Germans must submit to the condi-
tions made by the conquerors. The victors would be able to agree to dictate
conditions. But would they agree to make these conditions moderate! That was the
question. At that moment even France would be far from unanimous, as she had
been unanimous in defending herself. France was of one opinion on one point,
"Alsace—Lorraine snould return to France.«78
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In addition to official and private statements in regard to the Alsace-
Lorraine question, we get something of the opinion of tne people of France through
articles in the French newspapers. Speaking of Poland's future as to be deter-
mined by the result of the war the Temps( Paris ) observes , "It is a war for the
good of the peoples , a war to redress the errors of a century of history* Russia
reconciles the two great branches of the Slav family while France in reclaiming
Alsace and Lorraine, pursues la revanche , not for its own prestige, but for the
right of people to dispose freely of themselves" Regarding tne terms of peace
which will settle the disputes brought about by the present war, Mr. Jean Finot
Bu
in the Paris Revue of May 15, 1915, says, "Alsace-Lorraine must return to France."
There has also been in the French press a controversy regarding the future
boundary of France on the eastern frontier. From Tours comes a modest disclaimer;
the editor of the Journal d ' Indre-et-Lo ire refuses to pose as an authority but
states in his issue of May, 1915* "We French of course think that we must retake
Alsace-Lorraine as a matter of course, and many of us are of the opinion that we
should also secure a further strip of land along the left bank of the Rhine.
"Such geographical rectifications," says Le Petit Calais ien . "are of minor con-
sideration in France; territorial compensation, reparation, the redemption of lost
provinces - these questions occupy only a secondary position in France. The aim d"
the nation is a thing much higher. France seeks to establish good faith, civiliza-
tion and human progress and she is fighting for tnese aims against barbarism,
with morals of a remote age."^2 The Paris Figarc gives us tne views of a member
of the Institute, Mr. Charles Allemand, who considers that Alsace and Lorraine
after forty-four years of oppression would become French, and at an hour when even
some of their best friends had begun to despair of the possibility of their return—
ing to the motherland. J The Limoges Gazette du Centre says, "A victorious France
79 Literary Digest, Vol. 49, Page 530- ^2 ibid., Vol. 50, Page 1179.
oO Ibid., Vol. 50, Page 1140. 83 ibid., Vol. 50, Page 1142.
81 Ibid., Vol. 50, Page 1179.

47.
will gain from the war what we may call negative and positive advantages. The
positive advantages are both territorial and economic, and first of these is the
recovery of Alsace-Lorraine".^*
Victor Berard, Professor at tne Ecole des Hautes Etudes in speaking of
Germany's overtures for peace expressed his feelings in the following words,
"I say that it is criminal to talk of peace now. Woulu Germany consent to give
us back Alsace-Lorraine! At wnat price? On condition that we recognize the
annexation of Belgium. M^ Madame Daniel Lesueur, a distinguished French writer,
says in regard to the peace movement, "We do not desire a peace which wouUbe
simply honorable for us. No, they might offer us Alsace—Lorraine , which we are
not yet in a position to demand, and we would refuse, for our task would not be
yet accomplished. Dear to us as is that part of the national territory torn
from our motherland it is not that which concerns us now.M^6
At the beginning of the war the English governing class talked of
giving Alsace and Lorraine back to France and also of making the left bank of
the Rhine the eastern boundary. In a speech delivered in the House of Commons
August 3, 1914, Sir Edward Grey said in regard to the question of Alsace-Lorraine,
that the present crisis had not originated with anything which primarily concerned
87
France. Premier Asquith stated in the House of Commons May 15, 1915, "We
shall never sheathe the sword which we have not lightly drawn until Belgium re-
ceives in full measure all, and more than all, she has sacrificed; until France is
adequately secured against the menace of aggression; until the rights of the
smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation, and
until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed.
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After the German peace overtures of December 16, 1916, Premier Lloyd George said
in a speech delivered before the House of Commons, "Without reparation peace is
impossible."^ In reply to the desire of President Wilson, expressed in a note
to the belligerent countries December 18, 1916, that they woula make an official
statement of the terms upon which peace might be brought about
,
Lloyd George
said that all he could do was to quote what the leader of the House, Mr. Bonar Law,
said when he made practically the same statement of terms as those of Mr. Asquith -
"restitution, reparation, guarantees against repetition."^
Of all the countries consulted we find the most voluminous discussions
in the English press. Yet even here a disinclination to assume the prophetic
mantle is very obvious, and many say frankly that they have no idea what the con-
ditions of peace will be, or that they consider that the time has yet arrived for
fruitful discussion of the subject. The London Economist looks forward to radical
changes in the map of Europe and tne creation of a number of buffer states as is
shown by this statement: "France should recover the French speaking parts of
Alsace-Lorraine, of which Bismarck should never have deprived her; it i6 right
and reasonable, and in full accordance with the policy of nationalities as set
91forth by Mr. Asquith and several of his colleagues". Stringent peace conditions
seem to have occupied the Allied mind for a time, for as far back as October, 19l6»
the London New Statesman whose attitude has usually been pacific, thus outlined
the Allies' terms, "Frontiers to be modified as far as possible in accordance
with ethnographical divisions. Alsace-Lorraine to pass to France".92 The editor
of the Saturday Review said in regard to territorial arrangements, "Y/e all desire
to see the new Europe freed from the most pressing and obvious difficulties of the
past, and some at least of these can only be solved by territorial arrangements.
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First and foremost is the problem of Alsace-Lorraine. Can any one imagine a
Europe freed from the menace of war so long as those provinces remain under German
ruls? For more than fifty years the Germans exhausted every trick of coercion
and cajolery to win over the peoples whom they annexed and they completely failed.
ithin the provinces and across frontier in France the fixed determination to
secure reunion could not be shaken, and now the hope of deliverance has dawned, is
it conceivable that the Allies, if they have the decision, will permit these
provinces to fall back into the aggravated tyranny of German rule? To our minds,
from the standpoint of increased human happiness, there is no war aim so important
as the restoration to France of her lost provinces."^ The Spectator in response
to President Wilson's v/ish for a statement of peace terms, says, "Alsace-Lorraine
shall be restored to France**.9*
On January 22, 1917, before the United States entered the war, President
Wilson, in an addres to the Senate, set forth the principles which should govern
any peace with which the United States could associate itself, and be true to its
noblest ideals and traditions. Among these were the following, "Recognition of the
principle that Governments derive their just power from the consent of the governed*.,
MEquality of rights as between nations" .^5 David Starr Jordan, who before the
war made a special study of the Alsace-Lorraine question, said in regard to the
annexation of the provinces to Germany, tnat it was a nastake in these days to
hold conquered territory; that Germany was not fitted for tne task of dealing
with people not exactly like her own; that she had never been willing to try.
Germany was no melting pot of races and had no desire to become such. As to the
policy of taking French territory, Bismarck was strongly opposed and yielded to
von Moltke's insistence only on the necessity of retaining Strassburg and Metz,
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to which, in the military sense, Alsace ana Lorraine were outlying appendages. 70
Dr. Eliot, of Harvard, gave as the real cause of the war the barbaric state of
the German raind. In a letter which was published in the New York Times he
wrote, that all other causes such as the assassination of tne heir to the throne
of Austria-Hungary, the sympathy of Russia with tne Balkan states, the French
desire for the recovery of Alsace—Lorraine, and Great Britain's jealousy of
German aggrandizement, were secondary and incidental causes, contributing but
not primary and fundamental .97 "A French victory without the restoration of the
annexed provinces is no more conceivable than a peace which cedes 3elgium to
Germany is to ourselves. The alternative solution, the neutralization of the
provinces without their incorporation into France would be just as humiliating
to Germany and would involve the unhappy provinces in new difficulties by shutting
them off from the markets of both tneir neighbors. Alsace and Lorraine formed
part of France when she first proclaimed the living principles of democracy and
nationality. In the name of those principles France has never ceased to claim
them back", thus says one of the leading Socialist papers of this country.9" A
writer for the New York Times v/no signs himself "Cosmos" said in regard to the
settlement of this question that Alsace—Lorraine should be returned to France.^
In discussing the changes in the map after the war Theodore Roosevelt
suggested the following: "France must have b^ck Alsace and Lorraine, but as
there is a natural mountainous military frontier in Eastern Alsace, France mi^ht
consider whether it would be well to make this her boundary line if the Alsatians
show their desire to remain with Germany. But France herself must decide this
matter ."1°° Speaking of the prospects of European Socialists, Herbert Adams Gibbon
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said that the forcible annexation of Alsace-Lorraine had retarded the development
of a propaganda that would otherwise have been rapid. The shadow of tne treaty
of Frankfort obscured the relations between the German Slmpiro and the Third
Republic. Frenchmen who grew to manhood through that period carried through life
and kept alive in their children tne memory of the lost provinces. However keenly
imbued with the principles of Socialism they became, they were incapable of dis-
cussing with "comrades" common international programs and plans of action without
bringing up the old question. In International Congresses, Socialists have seen
the pernicious influence of the Treaty of Frankfort enter in to defeat decisions
101for common action among workmen to prevent the outbreak of the European war.
In August, 1917, Pope Benedict XV invited the belligerent nations to
make peace upon bases which he suggested. He favored restitution of occupied
territory and advanced indefinite proposals regarding other delicate territorial
questions. At the anniversary of the battls of the Marne held at a small city
near Epernay
,
France, September 3> 1917 » Ribot in a speech made in the presence
of the President of the Republic, Marshall Joffre, General Foch, and the principal
representatives of tne French and American High Command said, "While venerating
these memories which already svaor of the past and of the romance of by-gone days,
France now calls to mind and reflects on the great causes for which she has been
fighting the last tnree years. If we ask her why she holds out and continues the
struggle after so much suffering she will reply that she is not fighting for the
conquest of territory, nor to do violence to other nations; France only intends to
recover her lost property and those provinces which have been wrested from her by
the odious abuse of force. She must not be asked to waive this claim, for by
so doing she would betray the cause of Right. What a sorry preface to a treaty
of peace which we want based on tne right of nations, it would be to confirm an
The Public, Vol. 20, Page 56.
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injustice committed nearly half a century ago and against which the conscience of
the oppressed population and the conscience of the world have continually pro-
tested. The restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France is not one of those
questions that can be handed over for settlement to diplomatists. It is the
essential condition of establishing the right of nations that will insure the
lo?peace to be concluded against aggression." In a speech in the Chamber of
Deputies October 12, 1913, the Minister of Foreign Affairs said, "Alsace-Lorraine
admits of no bargaining or compromise. France must recover her own so that she
may regain her frontiers for her own sake and for the sake of the whole world.
Germany not being able to conquer by arms seeks to divide the Allies, sne tias
whispered to us that France could through the intermediary of a politician talk
of the restitution of Alsace—Lorraine . Herr von Ku'hlmann in a resounding declara-
tion affirmed that Germany would never restore Alsace—Lorraine to us. I prefer
this language which has tne merit of frankness. Our soldiers have made up their
minds that we shall gain the victory, we shall regain Alsace—Lorraine . The
question is brought forward as a condition precedent to a peace formed on justice.
There would be no peace which would guarantee our children from a renewal of such
a terrible war if the injustice of Alsace—Lorraine were not repaired. Mr. Lloyd
George and Mr. Asquith have both said that Alsace-Lorraine shall be returned to
France. The king of Italy, who visited the reconquered regions of Alsace saw
that there is no necessity of a plebiscite nor for any formality in order xnat
the population may become French at heart. King Victor Emmanuel gave expression
xo this in a telegram to President Poincaire', in which he said that the soul of
Italy is at one with the soul of France. ^-03 M. Ribot in a scathing criticism of
German diplomacy, said that Germany had hoped to divide the Allies by causing
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whispers to be murmured that if the French government would converse with her,
"We could count upon the restitution of Alsace-Lorraine". They hoped to suggest
to the Allies that nothing but the desire of France to recover her lost provinces
stood between the world and peace. "We have sworn", said M. Rioot, "not to
receive any proposal for peace without communicating it at once to tne Allies. Mr.
Lloyd George has given his explicit assurance to France that England would stand
by her until she recovered Alsace-Lorraine. The next day the United States made
a similar declaration."**"^ M. Pichon, tne new Foreign Minister, defines France's
attitude toward the recovery of the lost provinces in the following statement,
"In order to give to the world a peace of justice in conformity with tne vote of
the Chambers and the declarations of the Allied Governments we aim at the restitu-
tion of the provinces which were torn from us by force, the re-integration of
Al 6ace—Lorraine, a guarantee of a durable peace by agreement, and a general or-
ganization by a society of nations. We are in complete agreement with President
Wilson. He said, 'Our present and immediate task is to win the war'. Nothing
will xurn us from this task until it has been accomplished. Y^e shall consider
the war as won only when the German people tell us through their legally accredited
representatives that they are ready to accept a peace based on justice and repar-
ation of wrongs done, bince the seizure of Alsace-Lorraine we have not ceased to
suffer in our hearts. Never was it a question of our annexing populations under
any from 7/hatever by right of conquest. In the Allies' reply to President Wilson's
message it was no longer a question of the extermination of the German people and
their disappearance from the map of Europe, out tnat Alsace—Lorraine should be
restored to France" .""^
Commenting on Pope Benedict's appeal for peace, Echo de Pari s remarks,
"All Christendom expected an imposing moral judgment by the Holy Father acting as
10* London Times, Page 9, Col. 2, October 22, 1917.
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a political arbitrator. Alsace-Lorraine is the Frenchman's touchstone for a peace
proposition. The solution in the note is indecisive and equivocal." Tae Press
of France in general objects to only one phrase of the Pope's peace proposal,
"We must have Alsace-Lorraine I" "Pope Benedict suggests that the Alsace-Lorraine
question be settled on its merits. It is no longer a French question. The peace
of the world is involved in having this matter determined permanently. It will
soon be fifty years since France relinquished her claims upon Alsace-Lorraine. A
vastly larger thing - the final defeat of Germany's schemes of military dominance -
is the issue in the present war. However much we might like to see Alsace-Lorraine
restored to France we cannot afford to have the return accomplished as a result of
military conquest, apert from assurances of permanent reconciliation. The one
thing to be gained is thet Alsace-Lorraine shall cease to be a bone of contention.
An adjustment must be found that will be accepted by French and Germans alike in
their inmost heerts as well as in treaties. Furthermore, the adjustment must have
the express sanction of other nations. The world cannot tolerate the continuance
106
of feuds that endanger the general peece." France applauded President Wilson's
message of January 8, 1918, as a masterly expression of French war aims, and Le
Temps ana other leading papers expressed their gratitude to President Wilson for
presenting the restitution of Alsace-Lorraine as a necessary condition for a
general peace, a.nd not merely as a special claim to the French people. La Liberie
'
declared that President Wilson's words would make his name popular to th6 remotest
villages of France. "The question of Alsace—Lorraine is not only a French
question but a world question. It is a symbol of right. Nothing would be more
false than to pretend that we are prolonging the war for egotistical reasons".
The moderation of the French demands can be seen from the views of the
Review of Reviews, Vol. 56, Page 233.
10 7 Current History, Vol. 7, Page 277.
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Faris Socialist journal Humanite . which deliberately rejects any idea of annexing
territory with the sole exception of Alsace-Lorraine. "If our interpretation be
correct, the Allies, whatever the nature of their victory from a military view-
point, will not, when the time for peace arrives, push their demands beyond the
limits of what is just. As regards the conditions of peace, France requires the
restoration of Alsace-Lorraine but rejects decisively the dream of those who
clamor for the West bank of the Rhine
,
M1°£ Thomas Albert, "the leader of French
Socialists, says that the question of Alsace-Lorraine is not merely a French
question but is an international one in which mankind is interested. Alsace-
Lorraine kept under German rule means permanent violation of right in modern
Europe. It means that a just peace, conformable to the right of rations, has
not been secured. It means that the reign of justice has not superseded the
hegemony of brutal force. It is not only because the soldiers of the Marne and
those of Verdun, by their heroic sacrifices in defense of our common civilization,
have deserved to be rewarded by their restoration to France of ner national unity,
that Alsace and Lorraine must go back to France; it is because of the common will
of the Allies to secure the restoration of justice in the world. Great Britain
makes the French claim her own, not only because of her love for France, but
109because she has been, at all times, tne defender of right.
Mr. Lloyd George, English Premier, in addressing a delegation of in-
surance committees in October, 1917 » remarked, "No statement more calculated
to prolong the war could be made than the assertion of the German Foreign Secretary
that Germany would never contemplate the making of concessions respecting Alsace-
Lorraine. However long the war lasts England intends to stand by her gallant ally,
France, until she redeems her oppressed children from the degradation of a foreign
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109 Current History, Vol. ?, Page 493.

56.
yoke".
110
Mr. Balfour, British Foreign Minister, in a discussion in the House of
Commons said, "If France now asks for Alsace—Lorraine, I see no reason why Great
Britain should not assist her until she gets back into the position which existed
before the attack engineered against her by Bismarck in 1871, namely, that she
obtain restoration of that of which she was violently robbed more than forty
years ago. As long as France fights for Alsace-Lorraine we shall support her"«
In a letter to the Daily Telegraph of London for November 30, 1917, the Marquis
cf Lansdowne declared himself in favor of a revision of the Allies' war aims,
lest the prolongation of the v/ar lead to the ruin of the world and desired that
all the Fowers engaged in the war should enter into an international pact,
urder which ample opportunities would be afforded for the settlement cf inter—
112
national disputes by peaceful means. Britain's war aims were newly defined
in an address to the Trade Unions' Conference made by Premier Lloyd George
January 5i 1918. "We mean to stand by the French democracy to the death in
the demand it makes for a reconsideration of tne great wrong of 1871, when,
without any regard to the wishes of the population, two French provinces were
torn from the state of France and incorporated in the German Empire" . "This
eore", he continued, "has poisoned the peace cf Europe for half a century, and,
until it is cured, healthful conditions will not have been restored. There can
be no better illustration of the felly and wickedness of using a transient mili—
111tary success to violate national right". " Lord Lansdowne, replying to the
recent speech of Count von Hertling's reviewing the prospects of peace, said,
"When we come to the claims that, for tne sake of future peace, territory new
forming part of the dominions of one power shall be transferred to another the
difficulties to be surmounted become much more formidable. Such difficulties
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arise in regard to the French claim of Alsace-Lorraine, the Italian claim to
certain districts in Austria, and the British claim to parts of the Turkish
Empire. I am far from suggesting that all these are on the came plain, but they
all differ in kind from cases in which the question is merely one of restoration.
If we are, as the prime minister has told us, to have a great international
peace conference at the close of the war, is it not inevitable that there must
be submitted to it the questions belonging to the latter clase!^ 4 In a speech
of February 12, 1918, Lord George cleims that the vievs held oy the Central Powers
are insincere, that in the speeches of Count Czernin and von Hertling setting fox'th
the terms on which they would agree to peace no reference v/as made to Poland or
the legitimate claims of France for the restoration of her lost provinces. '
Commenting on the speech of Lloyd George before the Trade Unions' Con-
ference the editor of the Nation says, "Y/e do not quarrel with Mr. George's
proposal to offer the question of Alsace-Lorraine for 'reconsideration'. The
word it the right one, though we observe that the French version somewhat enlarges
it by substituting 'revision* . The German act of 1871 was the laproot of the
poisonous growth of militarism which has overshadowed Europe, and if German's
statesmanship exists in fact as well as in name, its 'reconsideration' ie the
way to her peace no less than to France' 6 ana the world's. In that view, Alsace-
Lorraine is merely a clause in a great instrument of reconciling polity. But if
it i£ set out as a fighting proposition, with a wide redistribution of Austrian
and Turkish territory attached to it, the statement is hardly a contribution to
the resettlement of society ."Us The Saturday Review seems to take exception to
the speech made by President Wilson as well as that of Lloyd George; "We notice",
says the edit or, "a curious confusion of mind in both Premier and President on the
subjects of Alsace—Lorraine and the German Colonies. The provinces were taken
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frcm France by conquest in 1870; the colonies have been taken from Germany by
conquest in 1914-1? • If the taking of Alsace-Lorraine "be a wrong" to be
righted by restoration, the taking of the colonies is likewise a wrong to be
righted by restoration. In truth, there is no right or wrong about the business.
The taking of provinces and colonies is one of the consequences of tne war; and
117
their restoration or retention is a matter of bargaining when peace is negotiated",
"The right of conquest is the equivalent in international law of the law of
prescription in municipal lav/, which converts occupation into a good title," writes
a man, who signs himsel f'Diplomat icus", to the Saturday Review , "the inhabitants
of Alsace—Lorraine, as always heppens on frontiers, are mostly bilinguiete
,
but
the prevalent language is German. The German armies took these provinces from
France in 1870, because the French were unready for the war, owing to the corrupt
and incompetent government of Napoleon III. V/e all wish, hope, and believe that
the Entente will succeed in re-taking Alsace and Lorraine and restoring them to
France. Eut when we talk of 'right and wrong' , wnere are we! Let us look et
118
maps and histories and clear our minds of cant" "Sentiment and historical
tradition", the Manchester Organ says, "have really nothing to do with the
Teutonic claim to the two provinces." It remarks, "There is another reason than
that of sentiment for the German claim to Alsace-Lorraine. Out of 28.6 million
tons of iron ore which Germany extracted from her soil in 1913 1 21 millions
came from Lorraine. Out of 2,800 million tons, representing the iron deposits
of Germany, the German engineers admitted that Lorraine contained 2,100 millions.*
••Had Germany left Lorraine to France in 1871 it is certain there woulu never
have arisen in France a desire for a war of revenge. It is equally true that
without Lorraine and its ore Germany woula never nave been in a position to enter
on a world war"^"^
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British labor organizations surprised the world, and the Central Powers
most of all, by the promptness v/ith which they endorsed President Wilson's message
and declared their unqualified support of a continuation of the war on these lines.
Arthur Henderson and other leaders representing the whole body of organized labor
in England, drew up a manifesto next day declaring that democracies of the world
now had a program to which they could subscribe •^C-
President Wilson's reply to the Pope, August 27, 1917, forcibly stated
the aim of the United States to be to free the world from the menace of Prussian
militarism controlled by an arrogant and faithless autocracy. The American people
believe that peace should »«4 rest upon the rights of peoples, not the rights of
governments - the rights of peoples, great or small, weak or pwerful — their
equal right to freedom and security and self-government and to a participation
upon fair terms in the economic opportunities of the world.^1 At a joint session
of Congress January 8, 1918, President Wilson named fourteen terms upon complying
with which the Central Powers might expect us to make peace. The statement regard-
ing Alsace-Lorraine brought both houses of Congress to their feet cheering. "All
French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored and the wrong
done to France by Prussia in 1871 , in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, should be
122
righted. The President modified his statement of January 8 somewhat in an
address delivered February 11, 1913. In this address he said, "that peoples and
provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they
were chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited,
of the balance of power; but that every territorial settlement involved in this
mr must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned
and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of slaims amongst rival
123
3tates.
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Senator Owens introduced a resolution in the Senate January 31, 1918,
which was aimed to define the American attitude toward the solution of the Alsace-
Lorraine question. "The United States believes that righting the wrong done to
the French people by the Prussian government in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-
Lorraine will remove long pending grievances due to previous military aggression
and will promote future world peace. "124 «jjay 1 ask," says a correspondent to
the Nation t "whether the German claim to Alsace-Lorraine as territory to which
they have the right of possession and enjoyment is based on any other principles
than those which might be applied with equal cogency to the question of the pro-
posed German retention of Belgium, namely, conquest and deportation by force,
expropriation and deportation, veiled or open, of the original citizens to a
greater or less degree, old historic associations, linguistic, if not racial
relations, economic interests, political prestige? If we cannot justify or are
unwilling to countenance the subjugation of Belgium by Germany and Belgium's
future dependence on that Power, can we refuse to insist that Germany disgorge
Alsace-Lorraine?"^-^ "It seems folly to me, wrote Frank Simonds, editor of the
New York Tribune , "for the Allies to debate among tnemselves peace terms and
peace aims. What the Germans hope is that the French will be pushed into a
declaration of purpose to hold on until Alsace-Lorraine is won back to France."l2 ^
H. A. Gibbons thinks that only when Alsace-Lorraine is given back to France will
the balance of power be restored in Europe. Only this solution of the problem
will assure Alsatians and Lorrainers the opportunity to speak for themselves - an
opportunity they have lacked since 1370. When they become again an integral part
of France, the election of deputies and senators to the French Parliament will
take place. It will be a genuine plebiscite. ^ 2 7
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How does international Socialism desire to settle the problem? Upton
Sinclair proposes that all territories legitimately under dispute should be made
independent under international guarantee. There should be a league of nations
to police the world and to enforce the decisions of a world court John Spargo
gives as his terms the restoration of Alsace—Lorraine to France .1^9
Although the Socialists of this country have not expressed themselves
very clearly as to their opinion on the Alsace-Lorraine question, many people with
socialistic ideas have given their views in regard to the settlement of the
question. Stephen S. Wise thinks that Alsace—Lorraine must be restored to France;
that the restitution of stolen goods is not in courts of law considered cruelly
punitive but elementarily just. Alsace-Lorraine apart from the agony endured by
its people for forty years, was the price which Prussia offered the kingdoms and
peoples of Germany for their acquiescence in the Imperial hegemony of Prussia, for
their assent to the program of blood and iron.^30 Enlightened German Socialists
and democratic leaders all assert that if there is no end to the war but by
ceding Alsace-Lorraine, the war will continue until Europe, now a battlefield,
has become a shamble. James O'Donnel 3ennet compares their feeling toward the
giving up of Alsace-Lorraine to that of the United States were we asked to restore
Texas to Mexico
The contents of secret treaties revealed by Leon Trotzky, tne Bolsheviki
Foreign Secretary of Prussia, made public the text of confidential communication
between the Russian Foreign Office and foreign governments in the earlier years
of the war. One document declared that France claimed Alsace—Lorraine , the iron
and coal districts of France, and tne wooded regions on the left bank of the
Rhine.^
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The future of France evidently depends on the result of tne war. If
Germany should be able to retain the vast coal and iron resources of Northeastern
France, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Alsace-Lorraine, her population would grow at an
unprecedented rate, whil9 that of France would not merely remain stationary, but
would rapidly decline. In a few decades France would cease to be a Great Power;
she would become a Minor State at the mercy of Germany, a German dependency. It
is in the interest of Europe and of the world that France should remain great,
strong, and prosperous, that her population should again increase so as to enable
her to hold her own against Germany. Not only the political frontiers of the
world, but the economic frontiers, too, may have to be rectified if tne future
peace is to be lasting. "^3
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CHAPTER V
/
DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED SOLUTION BY A PLEBISCITE
In his speech delivered before the House of Commons on August 6, 1914,
in justification of the participation of the British Empire in the European War,
Mr. Asquith, the English Prime Minister, expressed himself to this effect: MWe
are fighting to vindicate the principle that the small nationalities are not to
be crushed, in defiance of international good faith, by the arbitrary will of a
strong and overmastering power." On several occasions members of the British and
the French cabinets have emphasized the same idea, that the small nations, even
the weakest among them, have an equal right to existence with the greatest, and
that it is in defense of this right that the Allies are risking the lives of
hundreds of thousands of men. "The people are resolved to dispose of themselves
in freedom", proclaims M« Viviani, Premier of France at the outbreak of the war.
In terms yet more precise, Mr. Lloyd George thus defines the object of the war,
"This," he declares, "is a war of nationalities ."134 By far the most striking
feature of this war is the way in which it hes raised, one after another, most
of the national question? of Europe.
As distinguished from states, nationalities are not sovereign. That
is to say they have no legal recognition, they are in the strictest sense, without
rights. The individuals who compose them may indeed enjoy full civil rights,
they may even share all the political rights of the states to which they are
subject; such is the case with th6 inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine, with the
exception of direct representation in the Bundesrath. But these rights do not
correspond with their will if they are separated from the political body which
they aspire to join. They desire to rule themselves, to live their own life, to
affirm and develop the bssic character which heredity and history have given them;
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they cannot do thie and submit to a law imposed upon them by a sovereign state. ^
The right of email nations to develop along self-evolved and national lines and
the right of nationalities freely to choose to what steite they should belong re-
ceived emphatic affirmation at the Conference of Socialists held at Stockholm in
September, 1917* It was repeatedly shown that the facts cf history teach the
lesson that whenever international adjustments have been made which violate the
principle of nationality they have always been temporary and have been broken
at the first opportune moment; moreover, experience and reason both demand the
application of the principle of consent of the governed to euch regions as Alsace-
Lorraine, Poland, and the nationalistic areas of the Austro-Kungarian Empire. This
would of course result in territorial readjustments and annexations, but they
would be voluntary, not forced, and would make for peace, not for war. It was
agreed that for the statesmen of Europe to decide upon international readjustments
which would violate a principle of such vitality and intensity as that of nation-
ality would be merely to invite future conflicts.^6 Treitechke seems to have
believed the same thing, as is shown by this statement: "War will never be expelled
from the world by international courte of arbitration. In any great question which
concerns a nation's life it is simply impossible for the other members of the
state-system to remain impartial. They must be partial, because they are members
of e living community, mutually bound together or held apart by a diversity of
interests. Supposing that such a foolish thing were possible as that Germany
should allow the question of Alsace-Lorraine to be decided by a court of arbi-
tration, which of the European nations would be capable cf reviewing the question
impartially? Such a thing is not to be dreamed of. Hence the well-known fact
that International Congresses are able to formulate the results of war, and to
decide upon it juridicially , but that they are powerless to avei't a war that is
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threatening. It is only in questions of the third rank that a foreign state can
possibly be "impartial" .137
That there was still an Alsace—Lorraine question after forty years ie
a sad commentary either on the justice of the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by
Germany or on the ability of Germany to assimilate that territory which she felt
vc£ historically, geographically, and racially a part of the Teutonic Empire.
In 1887, when protesting deputies were returned to the Reichstag in overwhelming
numbers, despite the governmental weapons of intimidation, disenfranchisement, and
North German immigration, Bismarck was face to face with the one great failure
of his career. He consoled himself with the firm belief that all would be
changed when the second generation, which knew nothing of France and to which the
war was only a memory, should people the unhappy provinces. But that second
generation came. Those who participated in the war of 1870, or suffered by it,
were few and far between. The hot—heads and extremists left the country and
their places were taken by immigrants who were supposed to be loyal sons of the
Vaterland . Those of the younger generation ran away to serve in the French
Foreign Legion and became naturalized Frenchmen before their time of military
service arrived. And yet the unrest continued. Straseburg, lietz, Mulhouse
and Colmar were centers of political agitation which an autocratic government and
Berlin police methods were powerless to suppress. -> To the Alsatian the desire
for freedom and peace outweighed all other national questions. For more than
forty years these people have been without a country; in the German Empire but
not of it. Somewhere, anywhere, they hope to find a,n equal place. But the
Alsatian's conception of freedom is that of individual opportunity, never that of
being a cherished cog in the wheels of a military machine in the guidance of which
1^9
lie has no part .-"The question of those nationalities who have not political inde—
1
1-57Jl Davis, H. W. C, "The Political Thought of Keinrich von Treitschke",
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pendence cannot be solved internationally. The American people believe that
peace should rest upon the rights of the peoples, not the rights of governments -
the rights of peoples great or small, weak or powerful - their equal right to
freedom, and security and self—government and to a participation upon fair terms
the economic opportunities of the world. The acceptance cf Abraham
Lincoln's immortal saying "that no man is good enough to govern any other man
without that other man's consent", is the only sound guiding principle for read-
justment of national, international , and racial relationships. It obviously
carries with it a referendum in Alsace-Lorraine. ^
The enormous industrial development of the provinces since l8?l,
typified by the fact that in 1913 three-fourths of German's output of pig-iron
cui/.e from German Lorraine is a further complication of the problem, says Ernest
Caucroft in the February issue of World Court . V/hereas formerly the problem
of Alsace—Lorraine was between France and Germany, and was strategic in character,
to-day it is economic and world-wide in the main features. In his view the peace
conference at the end of this war must approach a democratic solution of the
Alsace-Lorraine problem along these lines: that the Conference as an initial act
declare in the name of all free men, that it divests the German Empire of all
title to Alsace-Lorraine, thereby putting its stamp of approval upon a democratic
rather than a dynastic or imperialistic solution; that three propositions be
submitted to a vote of qualified persons under the supervision of the Peace Con-
ference, first, shall the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine be and become an independent
nation? If this be answered in the negative then the votes be counted on the
second, shall the ceding of the provinces to Germany under the Treaty of Frankfort
bd approved! Third, shall the provinces return to France! Another proposal is
that the Peace Conference remove the objection that because of arbitrary
-nri-lil: icnp
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conditions the French migrated and the Germans settled the land, by providing
that the vote be confined to the owners of the soil.but tnat for the French, who
are immediate heirs at law of the migrating Frenchmen, to be taken by a board
constituted by the Peace Conference. He also proposes on economic neutralization
of the province, meaning by this that the right be given to all nations to pur-
chase the ores, phosphates, and raw materials of Alsace—Lorraine on the same
basis and that if export tariffs be levied the same rate shall be collected from
all.^"^ The Soviets of Russia give as a solution of the question of Alsace—
Lorraire a plebiscite in which the voting shall be organized by the local civil
administration of the provinces after the removal of the troops of the two groups
of belligerents.^"^ The British Labor Party, profoundly sympathizing v/ith the
unfortunate inhabitants cf Alsace and Lorraine v;ho have been subjected to so much
repression, asks, in accordance with the declarations of the French Socialists,
that they shall be allowed under the protection of the supernationel authority,
or league of nations, freely to decide what shall be their future political
position. The policy advocated by the French Socialists if this: "The right
of France to Alsace-Lorraine remains unaltered; it was in violence of the rights
of peoples to self-determination that Alsace-Lorraine was wrenched from France by
the Treaty of Frankfort, to which France had to submit, and which has been torn
to pieces by Germany's own will in 1914; the document by which Alsace-Lorraine
was surrendered to Germany has now been destroyed; the right of France remains
immutable; therefore Alsace-Lorraine must come back to France. Y/e further add
that France acting of her own free will, will do herself honor by going so far
in her regard for the right of self-determination, as to agree, after Alsace—
Loraine has resumed her peace in the French community to a consultation of the
142 Review of Reviews, Vol. 67, Page 325.
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populations there, under the contol of the League of Nations. Jean Longuet
says that the solution which international Socialism desires cannot be better
expressed than by the views held by Charles Andter written in his book on Bis-
marck: "We can admit that France nas only a mediocre right to Alsace—Lorraine
having sold it for the sake of peace. But those who nave inalienable rights
and have never been consulted are the Alsatians and Lorrainers themselves."
That is the impregnable position which international Socialism intends to take
up, and has always taken up, which the Allied Socialists themselves unanimously
accepted when, at the Conference in London in February, 1915 » they proclaimed
"the right to dispose of themselves freely for all the peoples of Europe from
Alsace-Lorraine to the Balkans ."146
The French Government by a unanimous vote of the Chamber of Deputies
declared that it would never consent to submit the question of reannexation of
Alsace and Lorraine to the people of those provinces and refused in advance to
abide by any such plebiscit e no matter how taken.^7 At the Peace Conference
held at Brest-Litovsk on December 2, 1917 » between the Central Powers and the
Bolsheviki, the Bolsheviki proposed that national groups not independent before
the war be left to decide by referendum whether they should oecome independent
or give their allegiance to some power; and that the Alsace—Lorraine problem be
148
settled by a free plebiscite . It has been rumored that the German government,
if forced to it, might consent to a plebiscite for Alsace—Lorraine
,
believing
that since eight-ninths of the inhabitants speak German a majority would vote
149 /to stay in the German Empire. Professor Lusson says in regard to a plebiscite
,
"to let a people or still more a fraction of a people decide international question^
for instance, which state shall control them, is as good as making the children
of the house vote for their father. It is the most ridiculous fallacy that human
145 Current History, Vol. 7, Page 490. 148. Current History ,Vol
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will has ever conceived." ^-5® Jean Longuet in an article written to the Nation
says, MA decision taken by Alsace-Lorraine itself to return to France would
have such weight that the German nation would have to bow before it; it would
prepare the way for the reconciliation which is impossible so long as this
poisoned ulcer remains in the body of Europe. If, on the other hand, Alsace-
Lorraine should clearly express the will to remain German , then the revanche
propanganda would be met with a moral and material impossibility. In either case
the road would be free for the international proletariat thenceforward to pursue
without obstacle the transformation of present day society".
150 Jordan, Page 5&«
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CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION OF POSSIBILITY OF AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE
"It is not admissible that the question of Alsace-Lorraine should retard
indefinitely the general development of Europe. The Franco-German understanding,
with the granting to Alsace—Lorraine a government responding to its wishes, would
remove the worst obstacle to the general pacification of Europe and would open to
civilization new lines of progress. This solution, which, in assuring the peace
of the world, would guarantee the development of the two provinces, would unfor-
tunately offend the vanity of both countries as well as give displeasure to
powerful interest. It is for the people of Alsace—Lorraine to demand it loudly
and clearly. They may thus come to form the bridge between two nations instead
of D6ing a fortress and a battlefield. No war, a Franco-German understanding,
152
and autonomy for Alsace—Lorraine" ; this was the view asserted by David Starr
Jordan after his travels in the provinces before the present war.
Since 1871 there have been notable changes in the situation. The
generation of natives bom since the war has ceased to consider France as its
native land, having no direct communication with that country and no longer
taking part in its life. In place of sentiment for France and in spite of the
protest of 1871, there has grown up a movement for autonomy, looking forward to
an Alsace-Lorraine enjoying political rights equal to those of the German states,
not in theory alone (for the constitution of the empire seems to give the same
rights as to other citizens) but in practice. Thit autonomy should offer the
people of Alsace-Lorraine the opportunity to develop themselves along the lines
traced by their character and history, and an equality not alone of law, but of
^2 Jordan, Page 10 6.
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fact, with other Germans.1^ Instead of asking for a revision of the Peace of
Frankfort, the Alsatians made autonomy their program, and insisted that their
anti-Pruscian agitation had as its aim only, to quote the words of Herr Wolff,
"the elevation of Alsace-Lorraine to the rank of an independent state, like the
other twenty-five component parts of the German Empire". On May 6, 1912, the
following motion, presented by leaders of four of the political groups in the
Reichsland . was voted on without discussion by the Landtag; "The Chamber invites
the Statthalter to instruct the representatives of Alsace—Lorraine in the Bundes—
rath to use all the force they possess against the idea of a war between Germany
and France, and to influence the Bundesrath to examine the ways which might
possibly lead to a rapprochement between France and Germany which would help put
an end to rivalry between them. What does Alsace-Lorraine want: what would
the people be satisfied with! The two provinces would wish to be put on the same
footing as any of the confederated states of Germany. They claim that they are
entitled to the status of a Wurtemberg or a Bavaria, though naturally they do
not want a German king to be foisted on them for the purpose. They desire to be
allowed to develop themselves along congenial and national lines, and to be
ICC
relieved from the degrading tutelage in which Germany continues to hold them.
The following statements, quoted from leading Alsatians, are typical
of the attitude of a great majority of them: "War is the worst possible solution
of our problems, because war is no solution. With war there is never a solution
of any question. Alsace has been part of Germany, of Austria, of France, and
now of Geraiany again. If France should gain Alsace by war, it would be only
the beginning of another war and so on without end. Our hope is in the change of
feeling in Germany, the growth of a free-minded party, and in the rising demand
for local rights and local freedom among the German people in the place of
concentrated paternalism." 1^ In 1913 David Starr Jordan wrote, "Just now Alsace-
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Lorraine asks for autonomy, for Home Rule within the Empire. No man familiar
157
with Imperial politics expects or hopes to see this region returned to France."
The political ideal of the Alsatians has been self—government . Their agitation
has not been for separation from the German Confederation but for a place iji
158
the German Confederation. ' Turning toward Germany, Frederick Hartmann spoke
these words which are the key to the whole situation of Alsace—Lorraine
,
"By the
fact that you have conquered us, you owe us a status in law, a civil and political
constitution in harmony with our traditions and with our customs ."159
A letter written by R. M . Bauer of Baden in Aargau in defense of the
independence of Alsace—Lorraine is now going the rounds of the Swiss papers:
"Only an independent free Alsace-Lorraine can bring the guarantee of an epoch of
peace in Europe. Both opponents would learn to meet again without hate, to the
welfare of common humanity. Alsace—Lorraine would help both to reconciliation.
They would themselves become a free people in free Europe."l^O Dr. Nasmyth
proposes for a solution of the question over the disputed territory of Alsace-
Lorraine, that they be granted autonomy, Home Rule, and the right to develop
their own civilization and economic life, that because of the denial of these
vital needs, Alsace—Lorraine has become the center of political inflammation on
161
the map of Europe. President Wilson in his speech before the Senate January 22,
1913, declared that there must be no dictated peace, that the rights of nations,
big and little, must have equal consideration, that peace must be based on the
162
right of self-government.
Bismarck seems to have admitted the truth when he spoke of the folly of
mutiliating France, and when he advocated autonomy for the Reichsland on the
ground that the more the Alsatians felt themselves to be Alsatians, the mors they
157 Jordan, Page 48. 160 The Public, Vol. 22, Page 1208.
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would detach themselves from France.^3 Treitschke said, "We wish to demand for
Alsace self—government in the German sense, the self—governraent which was recently
outlined for us by the Imperial Chancellor. It is undeniable that it is a bold
idea to make the experiment of free self—government in Alsace ; for every form
of self-government depends in the first place upon tne higher classes which are
the least friendly toward us. There will be many a disappointment for German
self-government consists less in extended electoral rignts than in tne fulfillment
164
of different states of honorable service in communities and districts."
Liarcel Semblat seems to have expressed the opinion of the French before
the war in regard to a settlement of the question such as to avoid war, "If we
would keep out of the fire, let us refrain from asking Germany for that which
she cannot give us. She cannot give us Alsace—Lorraine , not even a little slice
of it. She cannot exchange it in whole or in part against colonies, not even
all our colonies. I do not believe, and I have no reason to believe that she
will consent to discuss their autonomy as a condition preliminary to an agreement
(Franco-German) of which this is the natural and certain end. Let us not demand
the impossible. The question can be settled only by granting equal rights within
the Empire."! 65
Having recognized the right of smaller nations within an empire to some
voice in the government of that body, the Peace Conference may perhaps come to an
understanding regarding the future of Alsace—Lorraine and other regions. If the
opposition betv/een France and Germany could exist no longer, Germany would have
no reason to fear hostile acts nor to refuse the freedom necessary to the
development of Alsace-Lorraine.
163 Perris, Herbert, "Germany and the German Emperor", Page 27 7
•
164 Treitschke, Heinrich von, "German, France, Russia and Islam", Page 186.
165 Jordan, Page 93»
t
CHAPTER VII
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION AND CONCLUSION
A first stone in the foundation of the present war was laid in 1870,
when Germany despoiled France of Lorraine. This was true not alone because
France regards with jealous solicitude every foot of French soil; but because of
the importance of Lorraine in the German scheme of things out of which grew the
Pan-German creed of a Teuton hegemony in Llittel Europe.. The value of tne terri-
tory Germany secured from France in 1871 is indicated in a statement by Otto Hue,
Socialist member of the Reichstag: "Of the 34,000,000 tons of iron ore worked
up in German smelters and foundries in 1913 > some 23,250,000 tons came from the
interior of the Empire, and as of that only about 7,000,000 tons were produced
outside of Alsace—Lorraine , a simple calculation shows that already in 1913 some
seventy per cent of the German ore used came from Lorraine ,1^6 ^e entirely
reasonable, then, that as between the vvestern group of warring Powers, the real
bone of contention should be Lorraine, for if Germany loses Lorraine she will lose
167
about three-fourths of her annual production of iron ore.
What France lost is clearly stated by Henri Berenger, member of the
French Senate: "There is no reason to be astonished that Germany, from the very
beginning of the war, has sought to maintain possession of the Basin of Briey
which represented ninety per cent of our iron production, and that the attack on
Verdun has been for the purpose of confirming and perpetuating this possession.
Before the war Germany produced annually 28,000,000 tons of iron, of which
21,000,000 tons came from that part of the Basin of Briey which has been annexed
to Germany since 1370-1871- France produced annually 22,000,000 tons of iron, of
166 McClure, S. S., "Obstacles to Peace," Page 111.
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which 15,000,000 tons came from the part of the Basin of Briey which has
remained French #.** # Since the war began France, having lost the Basin of Briey
through invasion, has been almost exclusively furnished witn iron from England
and America"
•
"Germany on the contrary, having occupied at the same time the Basin of
Briey in France and in Luxemburg, has put into operation nearly all the great
furnaces here and thus adds to her 28,000,000 tons, before the war, xhe 15,000,000
tons of our basin and the 6,000,000 of the Basin of Luxemburg, making a total of
4^,000,000 tons of iron for herself and allies. Germany has at her disposition
about 45
,
000,000 tons of ore for udlitary and naval appliances of all sorts. We
have left Germany in possession of ninety per cent of our French production of
iron and eighty per cent of the national production of steel we had before the
war. Here, notably, is what one may read since May 20, 1915 # In the 'Confidential
Memorandum on Conditions of Future Peace', which was addressed to von Bethmann-
Hollweg, Chancellor 01 the Empire, by tne six great industrial and agricultural
associations of Germany: *If the production of pig iron and sxeel had not been
doubled since August, 1914, the continuation of the war would have been impossi-
ble. At present the mineral of Briey furnishes from sixty to eighty per cent of
the appliances made from iron and steel. If this production be disturbed the war
will be practically lost*.
"British and French naval and mercantile power overcame the tremendous
handicap under which France suffered. France had to import coal, iron, and steel;
had to make an enormous increase in manufacturing facilities; and at the same time
wage a colossal war"
If Alsace is restored to France, Germany will no longer be able to
boast' that through her control of the only known large deposits of potash salts
168 McClure, Page 111,
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she could say which of the uncultured nations should eat and which should starve.'
Practically the entire commercial supply of potash of the whole world was ob-
tained before the war from the mines at Stras6furt, in the Prussian province of
Saxony; but it has been disclosed recently that potash deposits were discovered
in Alsace in 1909 which are larger and more accessible than those of Strassfurt.
They contain about 1,500,000,000 tons of potash salts in a form readily usable
for agricultural fertilizer without separation from magnesium salts, as is re-
quired with the Strassfurt salts. These deposits are located near Wittelhein and
were first discovered when some deep borings for coal were made in that vicinity.
The first production from this deposit began in 1910, but under a German govern-
ment regulation it has been carefully restricted. Fifteen mines in Alsace, with
a capacity of 800,000 tons a year are allowed to sell only 80,000 tons and the
total amount permitted to be produced in Alsace is restricted to one—tentn of the
total German production. This procedure is due to the attempts of the German
authorities to control and strengthen their potash supply .^69
If France gets back Lorraine the production of iron ore in Germany
calculated as before tne war would be 7, 461, 638 tons and in France 42,850,265
tons. Should Germany keep the Briey Basin which she now holds, the production in
170
Germany would be 41, 307,143 tons, and in France 9,104,760 tons.
As Germany has hoped to recoup a large part of her war costs by making
the rest of the world pay for potash after the war, and to utilize what she has
regarded as control of the world's fertility as a club to compel concessions
whenever the Peace Conference shall convene, the surrender of Alsace to France
-;ill tnus be a sacrifice which she will not consent to make unless more favorable
conditions develop in her relations with Russia.
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The solution of the question of Alsace-Lorraine is not a simple one.
Germany realizes that if Alsace is restored to France its potash resources will
not only break its monopoly of the entire commercial supply but will provide
France with a valuable export commodity to exchange for the vast supplies of all
kinds she must obtain. Should the Allies succeed in driving the German army be-
hind the Rhine, what would be the German situation with respect to steel! The
first loss would be that from the Lorraine and Luxemburg fields^of more than
half of Germany's total supply of ore. The French fields of Longwy would of
course be restored to their rightful owner involving another net loss of at least
ten million tons more. Germany's total v/ould be still further reduced by the
loss of the Rhineland fields, so that the net result would be approximately as
shown by the following table: ^71
German Ore Supjgly from Behind th e Rhine ; In Tons
Supply in
1913
Lost through
Invasion
Balance
Lorraine 21,000,000 21,000,000
Other German Fields 7,000,000 2,000,000 5,000,000
Sweden 4,600,000 4,600,000
Russia 500,000 500,000
Miscellaneous 1,400,000 1,400,000
Frpnce 3,800,000 3,800,000
Spain 3,600,000 3,600,000
The solution of the question of Alsace—Lorraine would seem to rest
in the fusion of the different interests so that both interests and traditions
shall be safeguarded. A Franco-German understanding seems to be the necessary
preliminary solution. An adjustment must be found that will be accepted by
French and Germans alike in their hearts as well as in their treaties. Further-
171 World's Work, Vol. 35, Page 255- See also inserted map.
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more the adjustment must have the express sanction of other nations. The world
cannot tolerate the continuance of feuds which will endanger the general peace.
If an economic neutralization of these provinces can be agreed upon by which the
right is given to all nations to purchase the ores, phosphates, and raw materials
of Alsace-Lorraine on the same basis, and if export tariffs be levied with the
same rate for all, the members of the Peace Conference may be able to come to an
understanding regarding the future of Alsace—Lorraine.
Of course if we consider the matter from a democratic point of view
rather than from an economic, the crucial question ic whether the people of
Alsace—Lorraine vish to live under France, to remain under Germany, or to accept
another solution. If the sentiment of the people is in favor of returning to
France, a democratic settlement should afford them a chance to do so. But if
agreeable to them, an ideal solution, which would be possible if the Peace Confer-
ence succeeds in establishing a 'League to Enforce Peace', is the creation of an
independent Alsace—Lorraine under the control of this League in which French and
German culture would be free to develop unhampered and in friendly rivalry.

Appendix I
Declaration des deputies alsaciens et lorrains a l'Assemblee nationals de
Bordeaux (17 fevrier 1871)
"Nous, soussigne's, citoyens frangais, choisis et deputed par lee de-
part ements du Bas-Rhir. f du Haut—Rhin, de la Moselle et de la Meurthe, pour ap—
porter a l'Assemblee nationale de France 1' expression de la volonte' unanime des
populations de 1 'Alsace et de la Lorraine, apres nous 'etre rlunis et en avoir
delibere, nous avons resolu d'exposer dans une declaration solennelle leure
droits sacres et inalienables , afin que l'Assemblee nationale, la France et
1 'Europe, ayant sous les yeux les voeux et resolutions de nos commettants , ne
puiseent consommer, ni laisser consommer aucun acte de nature a porter atteinte
aux droits dent un mandat ferme nous a confie" la garde et la defense.
"Declaration:
"I. L'Alsace et la Lorraine ne veulent pas etre alienees.
"Associees depuic plus de deux siecles a la France dans la bonne comme
dans la mauvaise fortune, ces deux provinces, sans cesse exposees aux coups de
l'ennemi, se sont constainment sacrifices pour la grandeur nationale; elles ont
scelle de leur sang 1' indissoluble pacte qui les rattache a 1 • unite' francaise.
Mises aujourd'hui en question par les pretentions etrangeres, elles affiraent
a travers les obstacles et tous les dangers, sous le joug meme de 1 • envahisseur,
leur inebraniable fidelite'.
"Tous unanime s, les citoyens demeures dan leurs foyers comme les soldis
accourut sous les drapeaux, les uns en votant, les autres en combattant, sig-
nifient a l'Allemagne et au monde 1 • imrauable volonte' de 1' Alsace et de la Lor-
raine de rester francaises.
"II. La France ne peut consent ir ni signer la cession de la Lorraine
et de l'Alsace.
f
"Elle ne peut pas, sans mettre en peril la continuite de eon existence
nationale, porter elle-m&me un coup mortel a. sa propre unite en abandonnant ceux
qui ont conquis, par deux cents ans de devouement patriotique, le droit d'etre
defendus par le pays tout entier, contre les entreprises de la force victorieuse.
"Une assemblee, meme issue du suffrage universel, ne pourrait invoquer
sa souverainete pour couvrir ou ratifier des exigences destructives de l'integrite
nationale. Elle s'arrogerait un droit qui n'appartient meme pas au peuple reuni
dens^ses cornices. ^Un pareil exces de pouvoir, qui aurait pour effet de mutiler
la mere commune, denoncerait aux justes severites de l'histoire ceux qui s'en
rendraient coupables.
"La France peut subir les coups de la force, elle ne peut en sanction-
ner les arrets.
"III. L'Europe ne peut permettre ni ratifier l'abandon de l'Alsace et
de la Lorraine
.
"Gardiennes des regies de la justice et du droit des gens, les nations
civilisees ne sauraient rester plus longtemps insensibles au sort de leurs
voisines, sous peine d'etre, a leur tour, victimes des attentats qu'elles
auraient toleres. L'Europe moderne ne peut laisser saisir un peuple comme un vil
troupeau; elle ne peut rester sourde aux protestations r'epete'es des populations
menace'es; elle doit a sa propre conservation d'interdire de pareils abus de la
force. Elle sait
,
d'ailleurs, que l'unite' de la France est, aujourd'hui comme
par le passe, une garantie de l'ordre general du monde, une barriere contre
1' esprit de conquete et d' invasion.

ii
"La paix faite au prix^d'une cession de territoire ne serait qu'une
treve ruineuse et non une paix definitive, Elle serait pour tous une cause
d'agitation intestine, une provocation legitime et permanente a la guerre.
"Et quant a nous, Alsaciens et Lorrains, nous serions prets a recoro—
mencer la guerre aujourd'hui, deraain, a toute heure, ax tout instant.
"En resume, 1' Alsace et la Lorraine protestent hautement contre toute
cession: la France ne peut la consentir, 1' Europe ne peut la sanctionner.
"En foi\ de quoi, nous prenons nos concitoyens de France, les gouverne-
raents et les peuples du monde entier a temoin que nous tenons d'avance pour nuls
et non avenue tous actes et traites, vote ou plebiscite, qui consentiraient
abandon en faveur de l'e'tranger de tout ou partie de nos provinces de l'Alsace
et de la Lorraine.
"Nous proclamons, par les presentes . a jamais inviolable le droit des
Alsaciens et des Lorrains de rester membres de la nation franchise et nous jurons,
tant pour nous que pour nos commettants , nos enfants et leurs dsscendants , de le
revendiquer eternellement et par toutes les voies, envers et contre tous
usurpateurs

iii
Di8C0ur6 d'Emile Keller, depute du Haut-Rhin a l'A8semblee nationals
(ler mars 1871)
"Messieurs,
HA l'heure solennelle ou nous sommes, vous n'attendez pas de moi un
discours; je ne serais pas capable de le faire. Celui qui devait parler a ma
plave (l), le doyen de notre deputation, a l'heure ou 1 je vous parle, se raeurt
de douleur et de chagrin; son agonie est le plus eloquent des discours.
"Or^cherche en ce moment a nous faire une situation sp'eciale, et
j'entends dire de tous cote's: Vous,, deputes de 1* Alsace , vous pouvez voter contre
le traite; mais nous , nous le voterpns.
"C'est vrai, aous avons quelque chose de special: notre honneur a nous
reste entier; pour rester Franqais, nous avons fait tous les sacrifices, et nous
sommes prets a les faire encore; nous voulons etre Francais, et nous resterons
Francais, et il n'y a pas de puissance au monde, il n'y a pas de signature, ni
de l^Assemblee, ni de la Prusse, qui puisse nous empe'cher de rester Francais...
"Mais il ne me suffit pas que notre honneur alsacien so it intact, et je
viens re'clamer ici ma part de l'honneur francais; car, quant a moi, ce traite' est
une atteinte a l'honneur francais—et ce n'est pas seulement comme Alsacien, c'est
comme Francais que j'en souffre pour mon pays; quand on a annonce' ce traite', on
nous a dit que la paix etait necessaire, mais qu'elle ne eerait accept ee que si
elle e'tait honorable. Est-elle honorable, messieurs!
Voix si gauche .-Non
M. Thiers, chef du pouvoir exe'cutif . — Elle est malheureuse.
M. Keller. — "Est-il honorable de ceder des populations qui veulent
rester franchises et qui mtme annexees, rssteron franchises? Ahl je comprends,
messieurs, qu'on livre des pierres, des forteresses, des vaisssaux; mais que
diriez-vous si, sur ces vaisseaux, qui ne sont que du bois et du fer, vous livriez
des equipages, et si vous forciez nos matelots a devenir des matelots prussiens
et a faire la guerre a la France? Eh bien, c'est la ce que fait votre traite*
vous livrez a 1' empire d'Allemagne des populations entieres dont les enfants
seront obliges de servir les desseins ambitieux, despotiques de 1' empire
d'Allemagne, obliges au moins par le texte du traite'; car je vous le dis d'avance,
il y en a beaucoup qui, au peril de leur vie, se soustrairont a la servitude que
vous aurez e'dictee.
"A mes yeux, c'est la la plus criante, la plus cruelle, la plus abomina-
ble des injustices, et se faire, dans n'importe quelle mesure, le complice d'une
injustice, la ratifier, pour moi, c'est un deshonneur. Sur une question d'honneur,
la discussion n'est pas possible: a quelque parti qu'on appartienne, au parti
reoublicain ou au parti monarchique , on ne peut comprendre l'honneur de deux
manieres.
"Des orateurs ont tache de sortir de cet embarras , en venant protester
a 1' avarice contre le traite qu'ils signercnt et qu'ils voteront . C'est une
inconsequence qui ne saurait les absoudre.
"Ce traite qu'on nous propose de ratifier est une injustice et , en meme
temps, c'est un mensonge. On vous dit qu'on cede a perpetuite 1' Alsace. Je vous
declare que l'Alsace rsstera frangaise . Au fond du coeur vous-memes vous le
pensez
«
A gauche . — Ouii Ouil
M. Keller. — "Oui, vous pensez que l'Alsace est franqaise. Vous voulez
qu'elle redevienne francaise et je defie qui que ce soit se dire le contraire*
(1) M. Kuess, maire de Strasbourg, qui mourut le jour meme de la protesta-
tion.
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Et cependant^ dans votre traite vous venez de dire que vous cedez a
perpetuite la proprie'te et la souverainete de l'Alsace. Ce traite'est done un
mensonge, et un mensonge e'est un deshonneur. Au nom de mon pays, je proteste
contre ce mensonge et contre ce deshonneur.
U. Thiers, chef du pouvoir ex e cut if « — Indiquez-nous une redaction.
M. Keller. — "Ahi je le sais , on me parlera de la menace de guerre
et des dangers qui pourraient surgir.
"D'abord, en fait de de'snonneur et d' injustice, aucun pretext e ne
saurait Ptre suffisant pour les excuser; mais j'avoue que, quant a moi, je suis
convaincu que si la France avait ete plus fermement resolue a I'avance de ne pas
sacrifier son territoire, si la Prusse, qui desire aussi la paix, avait ete
certaine de trouver sur ce point des barrieres infranchissables , elle nous aurait
fait d'autres conditions.
"Je n'ai plus, a l'heure qu'il sst, la pretention de changer les dis-
positions trop arretees dans un grand nombre d'esprits. Seuleraent j'ai tenu,
avant de quitter cette enceinte, & protester, comme Alsacien et comrae Francais,
contre un trait/ qui, a" mes yeux, est une injustice, un mensonge et un desnonneur,
et si l'Aseemblee devait le ratifier, d'avance j ' en appelle a Dieu vengeur des
justes causes; j'en appelle a la posterite' qui nous jugera les uns et les autres;
j'en appelle a^tous les peuples qui ne peuvent pas ind/finiment se laisser vendre
comme un vil betail; j'en appelle, enfine, a l'epee de tous les gens de coeur qui,
le plus tot possible, dechireront ce de'teetable traite".

Appendix !!_
La Protestation de Bordeaux
(ier mars 1371)
"Les representants de l'Alsace et de la Lorraine ont depose, avant
toute negociation de paix, sur le bureau de 1' Assembles nationals, une declara-
tion affirmant de la fagon la plus formelle, au nom de ces provinces, leur
volonte et leur droit de rester franchises.
MLivre/s, au ^mepris de toute justice et par un odisux abus de la force,
a la domination de l'etranger, nous avons un dernier devoir a remplir.
"Nous de'clarons encore une fois nul et non avenu un pacte qui dispose
de nous sans notre consentement
.
"La revendication de nos droits rests a jamais ouverte a tous et a
chacun dans la forme et dans la mesure que notre conscience nous dictera.
"Au moment de quitter cette enceinte o\i notre dignite ne nous perraet
plus de sieger, et malgre l'amertume de notre douleur, la pense'e supreme que
nous trouvons au fond de nos coeurs est une pensee de reconnaissance pour ceux
qui, pendant six mois, n'ont pas cesse de nous dlfendre, etnouo dof ondre
,
et
d' inalterable attachement a la patrie dont nous sommes violemment arraches.
"Nous vous suivrons de nos voeux et nous attendrons, avec une con-
fiance entiSre dan l'avenir, que la France regeWr^e reprenne le cours de sa
grande destined.
"Vos freres d' Alsace et de Lorraine, seoares en ce moment de la
famille commune, conserveront a la France, absente de leurs foyers, une affection
filiale, jusqu'au jour ou elle viendra y reprendre sa place.
"Bordeaux, le I©r mars, 1871
•
f
"L. Chauffour, E. Teutsch, Pr. Andre, Ostermann, Schnegans, E. Keller,
Kable, Melsheim, Boell, Titot, Albrecht , Alfred Koechlin, V. Rehm, A. Scheurer-
Kestner, Alp. Saglio, Humbert, Kuess, Rencker, Deschange, Boersch, A. Tacnard,
Th. Noblot, Domes, Ed. Bamberger, Bardon, Le'on Gambetta, Fre'de'ric Hartmann,
Jules Grosjean"
.
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Appendix II I
Discours d'Edouard Teutsch, depute au Reichstag allemand
(18 fevrier 1874)
(^Traduction*
"Messieurs,
"Les populations de 1' Alsace-Lorraine , dont nous sommes les repre-
sentants au Reichstag, nous ont confie' une mission speciale et des plus graves,
que nous avons a
s
coeur de remplir sans retard, lilies nous ont charges de vous
exprimer leur pensee sur le changement de nationality qui leur a e'te violemment
impose' a la suite de votre guerre contre la France. L'Allemagne a intlreN; a
entendre 1' expos/ que nous voulons lui faire; et nous osons compter, kessieurs,
sur quelques instants de votre bienveillante attention*
"Votre derniere guerre, terminee a l'avantage de votre nation, donnait
incontestablement a cell.e-ci des droits a une reparation. LAais l'Allemagne a
excede' son droit de nation civilisee en contraignant la France vaincue au sac-
rifice d'un million et demi de ses enfants. Au nom des Alsaciens—Lorrains
,
vendus par le traite de Francfort, nous protestons contree l'abus de la force
dont notre pays est victime.
#
"Si, dans des temps eloignes et relativement barbares, le droit de
conquete a ou quelquefois se transformer en droit effectif, si aujourd'hui en-
core, il reussit a se faire absoudre, lorsqu'il s'exerce sur des peuples ignor&rts
et sauvages , rien de pareil ne peut^re oppose a 1' Alsace-Lorraine. C'est a la
fin du dix-neuvieme siecle, d'un siecle^ de lumiere et de progres, que l'Allemagne
nous conquiert; et le peuple qu'elle reduit en eeclavage — car 1' annexion,
faite sans notre consentement , constitue pour nous un vert&able exclavage mora\
—
ce peuple est un des meilleurs de 1 'Europe, celui peut-^etre qui porte le plus
haut le sentiment du droit et de la jsutice*
"Arguerez-vous de la re'gularite' du traite' qui consacre la cession, en
votre faveur, de notre territoire et de ses habitants! Mais la raison, non moine
que les principes les plus vulgaires du droit, proclame qu'un semblable trait/
ne peut etre valable. Des citoyens ayant une "ame et une intelligence ne sont
pas une marchandise dont on puisse faire commerce; et il n'est pas permis dls
lors d'en faire l'objet d'un contrat. D'ailleurs, en admettant rne*me, ce que
nous ne reconnaissons pas, que la France efit le droit de nous ceder, le contrat
que voue nous opposez n'a pas de valeur. Un contrat, en effet, ne vaut que par
le libre consentement des deux contractants . Or, c'est l'ipee sur la gorge que la
France, saignante et epuis^e, a signe' notre abandon. Elle n'a pas ete libre;
elle s'est courbe'e sous la violence; et nos codes nous enseignent que la violence
est une cause de nullite* pour less conventions qui en eont entachees.
"Pour donner a la cession de 1* Alsace-Lorraine une apparence de legali-
te, le moins que vous deviez faire, c'etait de soumettre cette cession a la
ratification du peuple cede.
"Un celebre jurisconsulte , le professeur Bluntschli, de Heidelberg,
dans son Droit international codifie*
.
page 285, enseigne ceci:
"Pour qu'une cession de territoire soit valable, il faut la "recon-
naissance par les personnel habitant le territoire cede' et y jouissant de leurs
"droits politiques . Cette reconnaissance ne peut jamais 'etre passee sous
"silence ou suprimee; car les populations ne sont pas une chose sans droits et
"sara volonte dont on transmet la propriete"."
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"Le despote frangais lui-meme, dont 1' Alsace-Lorraine expie si
cruellement la politique insense'e, et que vous avez la pretention de dlpasser en
liblralisme, Napoleon II, joignait toujours a ses projets d'annexion l'iie'e de
consulter les populations annexees. Rien de pareil ne nous a ete accorde'par
vous.
"Vou6 le voyez, Messieurs, nous netrouvons dans les enseignements de
la morale et de la justice rien, absolument rien, qui puisse faire pardonner
not re annexion a votre empire; et not re raison se trouve en cela d' accord avec
notre coeur. Notre coeur, en effet, se sent irresistiblement attire' vers notre
patrie francaise. Deux eie*cles de vie et de pensee en coinmun orient, entre les
ruembres d'une raeme famille^ un lien sacre, qu'aucun argument et moins encore
la violence ne sauraient detruire.
"Les ennerais de notre cause s'appliquent a^repandre dans la presse,
et sans doute ausei dans 1' enceinte de cette assemblee, l'opinion que l'Alsace—
Lorraine, a fait, aux elections du ier fevrier, une demonstration purement reli-
gieuse et catholique, et non une demonstration francaise.
"S'il est vrai que les vexations dont le clerge est la victime en
Prusse et dont e'indignent nos catholiques d' Alsace-Lorraine ont eu pour
resultat d'amener sur vos bancs un si grand nombre d'honorables ecclesiastiques,
connus pour leur patriotisme non moins que pour leur foi, nous n'en protestons
pas moins unanimement contre 1 ' interpretation qui nous occupe.
"Cette interpretation ferait en particulier sourire de de'dain la
fraction protestante et republicaine dont je fais partie, si noue n'y voyions
une de ces manoeuvres perfides familieVes a certains de vos politiques, manoeuvrec
qu'il est utile de devoiler.
"En nous choisissant tous, tant que nous commes , nos dlecteurs ont,
avant tout, voulu af firmer leur sympathie pour leur patrie franchise et leur
droit de disposer d'eux-memes.
"Pour coneommer cette annexion qui, a nos y6ux, est un acte inou'i
et que rien ne peut excuser, pour briser ainsi le coeur d'un million et demi
d'hommes libres, sur quoi s'est appuyee l'Allemagne? Nous vous demandons la
permission de le rappeler en peu de mots:
/
"1* Elle nous a, per une amere de'rision, revendiqu/s , comme etrait des
membres de sa famille a elle, comme e^ant ses freres. Or, vous sevez aujourd'hui
a n'en plus douter, que tout lien de famille entre vous et nou6 est rompu. Nous
prisons, plus que personne, le principe de la fraternite' des peuples; mais il
nous sera impossible de voir en vous des freres, tant que vous refuserez de
nous rendre a* la France, a notre veritable famille.
"2 9 L'Alleiragne
,
pour r^ous annexer a" son empire, a^ invoque les usages
de la guerre. Mais, ncus vous deja dit, un usage emprunte' a des temps barbares
n*8 que faire a une epoque de civilisation comme la notre.
"3°Enfin, l'Allemagne a invoque les besoins de sa defense contre une
agreseion franchise. Mais elle eut pu\, sans dlmembrer la France, atteindre ce
but, en imposant a son ennerai vaincu le deViante^lement aee fcrteresses d'Alsace—
Lorraine.
"II faut done chercher dans l'ivresse de la victoire, et dans cette
ivreste seule, la veritable cause de l'exorbitante pretention en vertu de la-
quelle nous somraes, aujourd'hui, des vassaux de votre empire. En cedant a cette
ivresee, l'Allemagne a commis la plus grande faute, peut-etre, qu'elle ait a
inscrire dans son histoire.
, f
"II dependait d'elle, apres ses triomphes, de conque'rir par sa
genercsite, non seulement 1' admiration du monde entier, mais encore les sympa-
thies de son ennemi vaincu, et surtout les not res, aN nous, habitants de
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1' Alsace—Lorraine . II dependait d'elle d'amener un desarmement de l'Europe
ct de fernier a tout jamais peut-etre l'ere sanglante des guerres entre peuples
feits pour s' aimer. II lui suffisait pour cela^ s'inspirant du liberalisme
que ncue aurions suppose chez une nation aussi eclairee, de renoncer a" toute
idee d'agrandissement et de laisser intact le territoire francais. L' Alleraagne,
a cette condition, devenait ^la plus grande et la plus eetimee'des nations, et
s'elevait a une place sans egale parrai les peuples de l'Europe.
"Pour ne pas avoir suivi, en 1871, les conseils de la moderation,
que recolte-t-elle aujourd'hui? Toutes les nations de l'Europe se defient
de sa puiesance envahiseante et multiplient leurs armements. Elle-meme, pour
mairtenir cette chose vaine qu'on appelle le prestige guerrier, e'epuise en
hommes et en argent. Et quelles eont, Messieurs, vcs perspectives pour 1'a.venix*
Au lieu de cette ere de paix et de fratemit e des peuples que vous etiez
rcartres d'inaugurer en 1871, vous entrevoyez, nous en sornmes sure, avec le
meme effroit que nous, de nouvelles guerres, c'est-a-dire la ruine et la mort
s'abattant de nouveau sur vos foyers.
"Croyez-nous , renoncez a cette politique qui nous aneantit , en
meme temps qu'elle compromet l'avenir de votre nation.
"Vous 'etes forts et puissants aujourd'hui, et vous pourrez par con-
sequent nous donner satisfaction, sens faire, a votre point de vue, aucun
sacrifice d ' amour-propre . Rendez-nous, ainsi que nous vous le demandons, la
libre disposition de nous-nfemes.
"II est d'usage, he'lasi lorsque, parmi vous quelque homrae gene'reux
eseaye, de temps a autre, d'elever la voix en faveur des peuples que vous op—
primez , il est d'usage qu'on lui ferme instant antement la bouche , en l'accusant
brutalement de trahison. He vous laissez plus, Messieurs, effrayer par cette
injure, qui ne prodve absoluraent rien. Traitres a la patrie sent ceux qui,
par une politique insensee, meprisant le droit et la justice, conduisent leur
pays a sa perte, et non les honnetos gens qui, penetres d'une injustice, d'ou
qu'elle vienne, ont le courage et la franchise de la signaler.
"Rendez-nous justice, Messieurs, nous oublierons alors trois annees
de souffrances pour ne plus songer qu'a votre noblesse de la derniere heure.
Noue serons, de ce moment, unis a vous, comme peuple ami, par las seule frater-
nite qui soit solide et durable, celle qui se fonde sur 1 ' estime'i
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